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IN THE BEGINNING: PEACE, SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT IN 
1960’s PAN AFRICANISM AND 1990’s REGIONALISM
INTRODUCTION: In The Beginning
1. PAN AFRICANISM historically focused on three goals:
a. self determination
b. self respect
c. self relianced
(or independence now/peace with each other/to achieve development)
2. It is in that context that Pan Africanism perceived Continental (or SSA) regional union as:
a. necessary
b. natural
c. self evident
(This perception partly related to ensuring continued independence, peace and economic 
prosperity, but also to the fact that Pan Africanism as an overarching exile and diaspora 
movement - for better and for worse - lacked the visceral national and institutional 
loyalties which mar - and make - regionalism today.)
3. Pan Africanism as regionalism was partly from distance, partly from strategy and partly 
from inadvertence very broad brush. Union government (representative, perhaps federal), 
unified armed forces (responsible to a union president) and an economic union (little more 
articulated than removal of barriers) were posited. These were seen as achieving security  
from recolonisation, local military indiscipline (i.e. coups), border wars. Its concept of 
security was implicitly household to macro though with the former almost assumed and 
certainly not institutionally articulated. Further that security was to be a base for economic
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progress with economies of scale, continental self reliance for most markets and sources, 
industrialisation, hydro power and transport the most usually cited means. Education, 
health services and representative union government (together with freedom from 
colonialism and neo-colonialism) were assumed or asserted to be adequate to ensure 
equitable distribution and near universal inclusion in gains.
The greatest obstacle to the regional vision of Pan Africanism was - in part inevitably - 
the course of the liberation struggle.
a. because each colony was a territorial entity with a state apparatus, the form of the 
struggle (inevitably unless it took the form of regional, or at least multi colony, armed 
revolution) was to secure control over and domestication (wresting from colonial 
suzerainty) of that apparatus;
b. this fairly inevitably led to different sub routes to and timetabling of territorial 
independence;
c. either independence as federal/confederal unities or immediate merger of newly 
independent states, far from being inevitable, required difficult acts of will and of 
synthesising territorial and leadership interests;
d. the attempts to achieve union at independence - or, more usually, immediately 
thereafter; Ethiopia - Eritrea, Mali Federation, East African Union, United Republic of 
Cameroon, United Republic of Somalia, United Republic of Tanzania, and (much later) 
Cape Verde - Guinea Bissau were with one exception still born, tempestuous and short 
lived or (at least in one party’s perception) new colonialisms leading to violent 
resistance and dissolution. The Cameroon exception reunited an entity World W ar I 
had sundered and the affiliating member was well under a fifth the size of its partner. 
The Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union, while assuredly grounded in overlapping concerns 
for the survival of self determination by both entities, owed little to Pan Africanism and 
is neither replicable nor much of an advertisement for quasi confederal unification;
e. arguably greater political willingness to accept real union (and a loss of some senior 
positions and freedom of allocation) could have limited the entrenching of the 
territorial constructs of the Congress of Berlin but only three Presidents - Leopold
Senghor, Modeiba Keita and Julius Nyerere - were willing to risk/invest in that 
exercise. The first two rapidly retreated when faced with the costs and limitations of 
actual Federal Union and Mwalimu found no takers in Kenya or Uganda for a 1962-63 
independence of an East African Union (not least because both numbers and polls 
suggested he - not Jomo Kenyatta and certainly not Milton Obote - would be elected 
as its executive president).
f. the one armed sub-regional revolution (Zimbabwe-Angola-Mozambique-Namibia- 
South Africa) was much later (indeed possible only after West and East African 
independence) and because of contextual variations (including the colonial role of 
South Africa in Namibia and the disproportionate size of South Africa relative to its 
regional siblings) did not lead and could not have led to Federal Union albeit it did give 
rise to the strongest sub-regional movement dynamic and institutional structure 
building economic and security coordination toward integration in SSA to date.
THE END OF THE BEGINNING: OAU and ECA
1. In practice newly independent African states (and for that matter Ethiopia, Liberia and 
Egypt) were singularly unwilling to merge sovereignty or to agree to substantial 
supranational institutions with real power especially in respect to armed forces. They were 
- in principle - enthusiastic about multinational economic initiatives in the abstract and in 
future perspective albeit much more equivocal about those inherited from  the colonial era.
2. The former characteristic was general - the existing French and British pan territorial 
political structures were swept away whatever their previous nature, duration or potential 
users to successor states. The reasons varied in detail but real divergences of interest and 
lack of agreement on gain (not least high office) sharing were a common theme. The 
second varied - Francophone W est African and Anglophone East African sub-regional 
economic structures (and independent state attachment to them in principle deep enough 
to cause devotion of major effort to restructuring, rehabilitation or even resurrection) did 
survive and apparently build independent roots into the mid 1970’s and each still has both
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real and potential political economic backing even though the east African one is largely 
both dead and superseded and the West African one has become less important relatively 
and perhaps even absolutely.
3. The founding of the OAU as a multinational institution of states focusing on political 
issues external and com mon to its members amounted to taking five decisions:
a. Pan African union was not an immediate agenda item and could become so only if 
a very large majority of state governments (continentally, SSA wide or sub-regionally) 
wished it to be;
b. in the meantime both intra state and inter state security required respecting 
boundaries at independence and rejection of forced union as well as of secession;
c. military coordination should be subject to ad hoc national contribution of forces under 
agreed OAU criteria (i.e. de facto  impossible);
d. Pan African liberation ideals were to remain focused on the last external bastions -
Rhodesias/Nyasaland, ‘Portuguese’ Africa, Namibia, South Africa;
e. except for external econom ic strategic issues (e.g. on occasion external debt and 
African common markets), economic regionalism  would be delegated to ECA. (The 
OAU had no economic policy analysis unit of its own before 1994.)
f. The OAU therefore became from birth a club of governments committed to progress 
within, and maintenance of, a system of national states.
4. The ECA was created as one of the UN system ’s global net of regional economic 
commissions within the central UN bureaucratic/administrative structure. Its rem it was 
economic research and analysis with a focus on proposals relevant to national/regional 
economic development. W hile continentally oriented and relating to overall and topical 
African ministerial fora, it was (and is) legally accountable to New York and headed by a 
Secretary General appointed, and operating on a budget provided, from there. 
Institutionally it is, at least in form, roughly analogous to a colonial administration with a 
metropolitan named governor (albeit a territorial national) and civil service and a 
metropolitan determined budget with territorial advisory councils plus a significant
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territorial minority representation in the metropolitan parliament (General Assembly). In 
practice - given New Y ork’s lack of the will or the means to impose detailed agendas - this 
gives a strong ECA Secretary General near independence from both African states and the 
SG, a role at least one played (or to critics overplayed) with very considerable diligence, 
skill and vision and to some substantial effect. Arguably such an institution was always a 
problematic partner for the OAU.
5. The political (OAU)/economic (ECA) or vision (OAU)/articulation (ECA) division of 
labour de facto  agreed in the early and mid 1960’s has proven durable (perhaps too 
durable) but has always been problematic:
a. operational politics and operational economics cannot neatly be divided in the way 
implicitly envisaged;
b. the OAU ’s personnel capacities have not enabled neither to make concrete proposals 
for articulation to the ECA nor to evaluate and enter into serious dialogue on the 
substance of ECA proposals:
c. the OAU has become - in Addis and in member states - a diplom ats’ preserve and the 
ECA a social and economic ministerial and official one with further weakening of 
operational interaction nationally as well as continentally.
6. The impact of these arrangements on Pan Africanism and regionalism has proven to be 
major and severely negative even though neither the OAU nor ECA ever so intended:
a. the formal Pan African leadership in OAU hands contracted to the continuing  
liberation struggle because integration based on economic means passed to the ECA 
or individual states and political route integration had been virtually set to one side in 
adopting the club of states approach to OAU;
b. but ECA was not well equipped to handle the political realities o f econom ic  
regionalism - though it certainly tried to fill this gap - nor to address intra regional 
bargaining over net gain sharing and status so that successful regional community 
launching and - especially - development depended in both ECOW AS and SADCC on 
a handful of state leaders playing catalytic and diplomatic mobilisation roles (in the
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latter case at cross purposes with ECA) and in that of PTA on the determination and 
dynamism of ECA’s then secretary general which, necessarily, could hardly be a 
continuing presence once it was established;
c. as a result Pan Africanism in the classical sense contracted, falling back largely to 
furthering liberation of remaining occupied territories (not unifying independent ones) 
and the political kingdom (with the economic to follow). On the economic front it was 
replaced not by the EEC model of political visions through economic means but by an 
overly economistic set of sub-regional constructs with inadequate attention to the 
political economics of survival let alone the political dynamics of Pan African 
integration.
THE NKRUMAH-NYERERE DIVIDE: A Revisitation To Reinterpret
1. The debate on classic Pan Africanism and speedy political and military union vs. slow, 
economic based integration in the early 1960’s is often posed as one between Osagyefo 
Nkrumah and Mwalimu Nyerere with the actual OAU/ECA tandem and its evolution a 
victory for the conservative, nationalist pragmatism of the latter. This is a distinctly 
inaccurate and unhelpful interpretation. Indeed in terms of the actual OAU-ECA- 
Integration evolution over 1960-1980 President Nyerere’s goals and vision were every bit 
as much the losers as those o f President Nkrumah.
2. In respect to commitment to classical Pan Africanism’s goal of continental unity Presidents 
Nkrumah and Nyerere were relatively close together with the real conceptual divide 
between them and a much more cautious conservative and nationalist position whose 
leading proponents were Presidents Houphouet Boigny of the Cote d ’Ivoire and Johnstone 
Kenyatta of Kenya with an intermediate group of whom the leading members were 
President Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal and the Nigerian leadership ultimately backed 
the conservative position.
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3. This is not to suggest that there were no basic Nkrumah-Nyerere differences but they
turned on paths, means and the nature of legitimate consent more than on objectives:
a. N krum ah’s “seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto ye” led 
to a much lower attention to economic issues and means than Nyerere’s contention 
that independence was a basic condition for social and economic development;
b. Nyerere, after the failure of his efforts to achieve a joint independence o f Kenya- 
Uganda-Tanzania as an East African Union, was convinced economic m eans leading to 
economic integration - not a leap to political and military union - was the only 
practicable way toward Pan African unification. He did not disagree with N krum ah’s 
contention that to will an end is to will an adequate means but did view the continental 
High Command/Government means as inadequate because unattainable;
c. M walimu believed in participatory consensus as the basis for political legitim acy and 
stability while Nkrumah was far more willing to seek to shout, face or force dow n 
opposition - an authoritarian reflex which, whatever its normative evaluation, was 
hardly practicable in an African heads of state context;
d. in the absence of a feasible road to immediate - or indeed imminent - political union 
and in light of the early independence history of - e.g. - Latin America and the recent, 
apparently ‘unreal’ nature of African territorial boundaries, Mwalimu placed a high 
priority on arrangements to limit border wars, secessionist wars and full scale wars of 
conquest - goals which the OAU has, whatever its limitations, achieved to a surprising 
degree - cf Latin America 1810-1910;
e. further Nyerere - who did have close working links with neighbouring states (and 
independence movements) viewed sub-regional groupings among already ‘acquainted’ 
states as necessary building blocks toward the continental level with the O A U , ECA 
and ADB as - inter alia - means to broaden contact and mutual understanding/feeling 
at ease as well as more tangible links. Nkrumah who was - along with Sekou Toure - 
isolated politically in W est Africa had no sympathy for sub-regionalism nor step by 
step approaches until very late in his presidency.
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4. The conservative camp either did not believe in the classic Pan African goals or, to be 
kinder, had a radically revisionist interpretation of two insofar as they related to African 
unity. Self determination was defined fairly rigidly within the parameters of territorial 
states. Cooperation am ong them and self reliance was posed in Eurafrican terms which 
critics saw as acceptance of neo-colonial dependency albeit this is for too simple and 
unkind a characterisation o f the (ultimately failed) vision of Le Vieux (President Felix 
Houphouet Boigny) its most systematic and steadfast political proponent and articulator.
Its agreement with President Nyerere was in a sense entirely procedural and first stage - 
OAU as a forum of sovereign states, self defined sub-regional groups as the main means to 
operational cooperation with economics their main content. In respect to views on 
subsequent deeper and more political unification the divide was (as became much clearer in 
the 1970’s) very great.
5. The characterisation of President N yerere’s stance - and later that of SADCC/SADC - as 
pragmatic and that of President Nkrumah - and later that of PTA - as radical is also 
misleading. President Nyerere was certainly willing to alter policies - even strategic 
policies - and to alter the balance of means quite drastically but in order to hold to, not 
depart from, goals and principles. Two major cases illustrate. In 1961-2 in arguing for a 
participatory, competitive one party system Secretary General (as he then was) Nyerere 
explicitly said review might be needed in 30 years as unity and participation were the goals 
and ethnic, class or religious based parties (not multiple parties per se) the ills to be 
avoided. In 1992 he advocated a multi party system. Similarly in 1984-85 he backed the 
initiation of radical economic strategy reformulation not because he agreed with the 
‘global’ neo-liberal consensus (any more than did Ministers Jamal and Msuya who had 
advocated the 1984-85 changes from 1981) but because he was convinced no viable 
alternative to preserve the health-education-nutrition-national identity gains of 1961-1978 
was in fact available.
6. Similarly President Nkrum ah’s radicalism could often be interpreted as rapidly altering 
means to sustain power as much as pursuit of any more general principle. Like President 
Nyerere he believed that in the absence of a dynamic national entrepreneurial class a 
leading state economic role was necessary to achieve full economic participation (let alone 
self determination or self reliance), but - in comparison to Tanzania - the Ghanaian pattern
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of policies and actions lacked a coherent strategy, a defined set of sub goals and the ability 
to remain solvent even briefly even in the favourable world economic and political 
economic context of 1958-1962. At a very different level when President Sylvanus 
Olympio of Togo was assassinated by Sergeant Eyadama (as he then was) acting for 
Jacques Foccart and the Elysee, Julius Nyerere wept in Dar es Salaam both at the 
imposition of neo colonial rule and the loss of innocence while according to Accra gossip 
(indicative even if possibly apocryphal) Osayefo laughed in Christiansborg Castle seeing 
the event only in terms of short run Ghana-Togo political relations.
THE OAU, ECA AND REGIONALISM : 1965-1980 (1997?)
1. The de fac to  division o f labour OAU-political/ECA-economic endured and evolved 
over at least a decade and a half and arguably remains basically unchanged to date.
2. The OAU ’s main agenda items were:
a. averting border wars
b. discouraging - by non recognition and non support - secessionism;
c. pursuing the struggle for liberation of remaining colonies and South Africa;
d. coordinating African policy on major global issues seen as of direct concern to Africa;
e. promoting African interstate cooperation including regionalism;
f. eschewing state and OAU intervention in - broadly defined - “ internal affairs” of 
member states.
3. In respect to the first two heads, the OAU had been remarkably successful up to 1990.
The main exception was Somali irredentism (or perhaps Somalian given that the only 
actual take-over was of Somaliland in a manner the High Court of the United Republic 
held to be invalid). The long running, albeit episodic, Nigerian-Cameroonian skirmishes 
turn the interaction of a woefully defined boundary (the main channel of the Cross River, 
whose whole delta shifts north and south in addition to shifts in which is - at times are - the
9
main channel) with a probable underlying oil reservoir. The Libyan-Tchadian war flowed 
from Vichy France's purported ceding of territory to M ussolini’s Italy and Libya’s claim to 
be Mussolini’s heir. But these stand out because they are exceptions - potential for 
irredentism, exceedingly vague or badly documented boundaries (including all ex-German 
territory water boundaries) and shifting in territorial lines during the colonial period could 
easily have spawned a hundred real wars - as they did during Latin America’s early years 
of independence.
4. Secessionist conflicts - except the break-up of last minute before or minute after 
independence unions - have been rare. The major examples - Biafra (if one ignores 
Ojukwu’s clear drive to capture at least all of Southern Nigeria) and - at times- the 
Southern Sudan - have not been replicated. Borderline cases - e.g. M ali’s Touareg, 
Senegal’s Cassamantians - look more like autonomy or redress of grievances struggles 
than secessionist wars. Even in the Sudan case there have been periods of quasi federal 
rule and is now a unified Southern Liberation Movement-Northern Democratic Party 
coalition with an agreed proposed federal constitution seeking to oust the despotic 
military/mediaevalist Islamic sect government in Khartoum. (The Sudan’s main Islamic 
tendency - Mahdism - is firmly in the insurgent alliance camp).
5. In fact the OAU has been ultra conservative in cases such as Eritrea and the Republic of 
Somaliland (1994) where a m erger of independent states on confederal terms had been 
violated by the larger entity so that a clear legal case for the legitimacy of separation 
existed. Eritrea became acceptable to the OAU only once it had the blessing of the new 
government in Addis while the Republic of Somaliland (which has a functioning 
government and public services) has no formal recognitions and clear de fac to  recognition 
only from Ethiopia and Eritrea. The exception - the Sahara Democratic Republic whose 
territory was handed over to M orocco by Spain when it feared losing it - nearly tore the 
OAU apart before the SDR was seated (and Morocco withdrew).
6. Liberation relatively rapidly came to focus on Southern .Africa - beyond the Ruvuma, 
Zaire/Congo and Zambesi rivers. The OAU was influential diplomatically and in 
coordinating African voices. However the Front line States (by the early 1970’s Tanzania,
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Zambia and Botswana with Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe added by the middle of 
1980) was much more operationally significant than the OAU as - on the diplom atic front - 
arguably was Nigeria.
7. The contrast between rhetoric and structures and operational support turned on the O A U ’s 
general lack of resources - of finance and, largely as a consequence, personnel. The FLS 
saw a com pact grouping with close links (from 1961 on) to Liberation M ovem ents as a 
preferable channel for resources than a weak OAU some of whose m em ber’s relations with 
the old RSA seemed to be covertly collaborationist, while Nigeria’s diplomatic offensive 
for the same reasons and to maximise prestige and influence gains was also kept largely 
separate from and at times imperfectly coordinated with either OAU or FLS.
8. Coordination was uneven but not negligible. Over time Francophone African global stands 
have become less tied to those of the Elysee and more akin to those of Anglophone Africa. 
W est African diplomatic, political and economic stresses now turn more on A bidjan, Lagos 
and - secondarily - Dakar and Accra differences of interest than on either ideology or 
closeness to Paris (let alone London). However the coordination has had limits because of 
the O A U ’s weak economic analysis capacity. Common economic stances usually turn on 
ECA and/or single state initiatives and ECA background papers and even draft text 
preparation.
9. However, on integration the OAU de facto  dropped out of the picture. T he tw o
exceptions - the Final Act of Lagos (1980) and the Abuja Treaty (1990) - w ere in practice 
ECA initiatives and texts (with nationally proposed amendments, particularly to support 
sub-continental building blocks as a first stage) adopted by the OAU. Given that the OAU 
has been founded on rejection of early political union (and the experience with smaller 
union efforts was unpromising) and had little if any economic analysis capacity or serious 
participation of main economic ministers this result, however unintended, was probably 
inevitable.
10. The avoidance of interference in internal affairs came to be read exceedingly broadly. 
Tanzania for example was viewed as very much out of line when in the early 1970’s it 
charged the M icombero Regime in Burundi with genocide and - despite substantial unease 
by many states - Emperor Bokassa (CAE), President Macias Nguema (Equatorial Guinea),
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President Iddi Amin Dada (Uganda), President Mengistu Hailie Mariam (Ethopia) and 
President Mobutu Tse Tse Soko (Zaire) were members in good standing until they were 
internally overthrown in the first four cases and until the mid 1990’s in the last. This 
interpretation of noninterference neutered the OAU as a regional force toward good 
governance. (The African Charter of the Rights and Responsibilities of People and 
Peoples was an initiative of G am bia’s President Jawara even if endorsed verbally by the 
OAU.) This did nothing for its reputation in Africa any more than abroad. By the early 
1990’s the policy had become politically bankrupt because a series of nominally civil wars - 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia/Somaliland, Rwanda, Burundi, Congo (then Zaire) - 
clearly interacted across borders and themselves spread instability and the real danger of 
war to their neighbours.
11. ECA - with a much larger budget and staff - took over the continental economic analysis 
and prescription role, nominally on behalf of OAU and under the leadership of Councils of 
National Ministers but in fact largely autonomously under the strategic vision and 
particular concerns (or lack thereof) of its Secretary Generals and their closest associates. 
This was particularly true in respect to economic coordination, cooperation and 
community building which has been an ECA focus for over three and a half decades.
12. ECA evolved from an industry by industry and key transport link approach to sub-regional 
community promotion to African Common M arket prophetic leadership. The shift appears 
to relate in large part to its dominant 1975-90 figure Professor Adebayo Adedeji - initially 
in his role as the driving force behind ECOWAS while a Nigerian cabinet minister and later 
as head of ECA. The results o f sectoral, project, and handful of country efforts to the late 
1960’s were sparse and ECOW AS (and the then East African Community) appeared much 
more promising models. Partly because of an exceedingly unfortunate mutual 
misunderstanding between the FLS/SADCC and ECA (especially its key Southern African 
official Bax Nomvete), but also because only SADC/SADCC and PTA (which 
unfortunately overlapped) showed much signs of sub-regional economic dynamic building 
ECA from 1980 on focused increasingly on achieving an African Common Market by 
2000. Whether this was any more a feasible direct objective than Nkrumah’s political 
union is a matter of judgement. Clearly it was at odds with deeper, more extensive 
sectoral coordination/integration and with linking of security and good governance ‘deep’
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economic community building dynamic. Clearly too - at least in retrospect - it had no 
political base. Those states actually placing priority on political or political economic 
coordination/integration concentrated on SADCC and/or PTA while the others showed 
little signs of serious interest in continental Common Market Building.
13. In the 1980’s ECA  became much more overtly political. It championed:
a. autonomous African directed recovery strategies (APPER and AASAP) and in that 
endeavour came into vehem ent conflict with the IFI’s and major external countries;
b. good governance - participation, accountability, honesty, frugality (in numerous annual 
reports and overall socio-political-economic projections). This did resonate with some 
audiences in Africa and externally but had limited (if any) impact on the regimes at 
which it was presumably most directed;
c. encouraged greater and more independent roles for African N G O ’s (not very clearly 
defined nor differentiated from external NGO’s present in Africa) in the Arusha 
Charter which probably stimulated and may marginally have strengthened the N G O ’s 
but had little resonance with governments especially because major domestic social 
sector bodies (e.g. churches, mosques, trade unions) were not clearly included, 
whereas external N G O ’s (rapidly coming to be seen as neo-liberal state deconstruction 
tools or worse) apparently were.
14. The basic reasons for the shift were fairly clear. ECA if acting purely as economic 
technocrats could not address the 1980’s crises effectively and an ECA technical 
economic/OAU diplomatic division of labour left yawning political econom ic and good 
governance gaps. Professor Adedeji hoped to catalyse African leadership by outspoken 
initiatives from ECA based on at least some independent professional analysis. The results 
- while not negligible, especially in some African states and potentially having longer 
gestation results on both intellectual and official thinking- were disappointing.
15. ECA did not venture directly into most aspects of security. Its partial entry was largely at 
the household level - food, livelihood, safety nets - notably in the Khartoum Declaration 
from  what was de fac to  a joint conference with UNICEF. Traditional military/policy/law 
and order security - probably prudently - it continued to view as outside its remit.
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16. As of 1990 the results - and especially the future - of ECA’s integration and political 
economic strategic initiatives were problematic but not necessarily gloomy. When 
Secretary General Adedeji resigned, ECA - in terms of strategic leadership whether i
analytical, strategic or intellectual - first slowed, then stalled and began to disintegrate.
SUB REGIONAL TRAJECTORIES 1960-1980: Instability, Persistence, Unevenness, 
Deterioration
1. Over 1960-1980 Sub-Regionalism was both the central focus of integration and its 
greatest source of frustration. Its two standard bearers: the East African Common 
Market and Services Organisation bom again in 1967 as the East African Community, and 
the new Economic Community of W est African States launched soon after, respectively 
disintegrated and stagnated. Elsewhere new sub-regional initiatives remained on paper 
and, of the old Francophone groupings UDEAC diminished and eroded while the West 
African monetary and economic grouping, survived but at low and increasingly peripheral 
benefit levels.
2. However, while deeply disappointing that record was not as uniformly negative as a 
brusque summary of 1980 makes it appear to be. The cynical play on ECOWAS 
acronym as “The echo (of the EEC Treaty) was” underestimates both the forces that 
brought it into being, the continuing belief in it that has both prevented dissolution and also 
limited decay thus keeping in being the potential for its - partial - mid 1990’s recovery.
3. In the immediate post colonial period many colonial territory economic links were broken 
but a surprisingly high number - in Francophone W est and Equatorial Africa and 
Anglophone East Africa - survived and, for a time seemed to prosper under independent 
management. Joint arrangements for infrastructure and operating units (e.g. ports and 
railways) disintegrated rapidly except in East Africa (where they were in a real sense the 
backbone of the EAC’s emergence) and in respect to Senegal River Basin dams. Rather 
later (because independence came later) the Central African Common Market and its 
parallel institutions were dissolved because they were integrally tied to the Federation of 
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and because the independence of Zambia and Malawi left 
Southern Rhodesia (as it then was) under “responsible” settler governance. Unequal
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distribution of gains alone would not have led inevitably to dissolution - in the EACM - 
EACSO to EAC case it led to renegotiation and rebalancing. But in East A frica in the 
1930’s the move to make Kenya a settler colony with “responsible” settler governance had 
failed so that all three states were majority ruled independent and - whatever their 
differences - relations among Mzee Kenyatta, Dr Obote and Mwalimu Nyerere were very 
different from those among President Kaunda, Kamuzu Banda and any of the Rhodesian 
Front Prime Ministers.
4. Francophonia had W est African and Equatorial African customs unions, com mon 
currencies, equalisation funds (to offset re-export losses of duty to interior states from  port 
city breaking and wholesaling) and various other joint activities overseen by councils of 
ministers and officials and professional central bank staffs. These did provide direct gains - 
not least lower cost customs administration and a certain degree of manufacturing 
specialisation and intertrade - even if the special currency arrangements providing French 
external payments and deficit cover in return for a fixed metropolitan/peripheral franc 
exchange rate and severe restraints on fiscal use of the central bank were dom inant. These 
monetary relations were part of the Euroafrican concept which - at least to Le V ieux and 
President Senghor - did offer a certain balance between preferences for French (later partly 
generalised to EU) goods, companies and personnel and French underwriting of fiscal and 
currency stability. However unwise or unequal they may in fact have been, they w ere not 
seen (at least in Dakar, Abidjan, Yaounde and Brazzaville) as one way streets or as the 
partnership of rider and horse.
5. While the French Colonial W est African Federation (AOF) was effectively dism antled 
before and terminated at independence, the economic regional arrangements associated 
with it survived. The most important was a joint central bank with a fixed exchange rate 
with the French franc linked to severe limits on fiscal lending by the Bank and French 
underwriting o f fiscal (subject to limits) and current account deficits. W hether a fixed 
exchange rate with the franc made much sense when the CFA countries inflation rates far 
exceeded France’s is open to question (the ultimate devaluation doubling the CFA /French 
Franc ratio came only in 1994) as is the viability of fixed parities among a very disparate 
group of econom ies with markedly different structural and growth (or stagnation) 
dynamics. The clear gain was the French Treasury underwriting of deficits and
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convertibility. The (substantial) interstate trade preferences (within an envelope of 
preferences to France and later EEC) did have some positive effect on trade (and because 
it suited French company concerns did to some degree disperse manufacturing) and the 
“solidarity fund” (nominally a transfer channel from richer coastal Senegal and Cote 
d ’Ivoire to poorer landlocked states but in practice a reimbursement of revenue lost on 
reexports from coastal to landlocked states under a customs allocation based on original 
declared destination of imports) did allow simplified transit trade and duty collection 
procedures consistent with avoiding loss of landlocked state net revenues.
6. These arrangements remained relatively stable through the 1970’s but - except for those 
related to the CFA franc and its French underwriting - eroded in the 1980’s. They showed 
little dynamism and new ventures - e.g. Air Afrique, the regional airline - tended to come 
to grief either because of clashes between national prestige/and commercial goals or - 
more seriously - from weak management and failure of sponsoring governments to pay 
their bills.
7. In principle the Francophone arrangements were no barrier to a broader ECOWAS 
grouping including the Anglophone states. In practice they were for four reasons:
a. France (but also Cote d ’Ivoire and Senegal) feared that Nigeria would be super- 
competitive economically and especially political economically;
b. the CFA states - reasonably - were quite unwilling to deconstruct their institutions until 
ECOWAS had a track record of offering larger gains (which it could not in the 
monetary or aid field and did not in respect to trade);
c. continued Francophone African groupings linked to France’s Francophonic (basically 
France/Affique) created grave (and partly unfounded) suspicions that while the voices 
were the voices of African leaders the hands were the hands of the French Treasury 
and the Elysee;
d. the combination of overvaluation but convertibility of the CFA franc and overvaluation 
(often more extreme) and nonconvertibility of Anglophone currencies gave rise to 
complex, cumulative incentives to smuggling and to currency routing hardly conducive 
to positive officially visible interstate economic relations.
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8. The road to ECOWAS was initially mapped by ECA and Anglophone W est Africa - 
notably Nigeria. Its most consistent and able advocate was Professor Adedeji and its 
political motor Nigeria which perceived West African regionalism under its leadership as 
economically (e.g. industrialisation) and politically potentially highly profitable. The 
process of convincing the Francophone states (and to a lesser extent Ghana) to jo in  was 
lengthy taking over a decade. The key facilitating mechanism may well have been a 
Nigerian funded (out of what proved to be fleeting oil generated surpluses) o f a W est 
African soft development finance institution tied to ECOWAS.
9. In form  ECOWAS is modelled on the EU with a broad array of initial sectors and more 
added fairly regularly (perhaps to camouflage failure to progress in existing ones). While 
ECOWAS did set up a trade balance clearing mechanism, highly unrealistic official 
exchange rates and lagged or non clearing by debtors rapidly rendered it at best peripheral 
and no serious tariff preferences emerged despite interminable negotiations. An initially 
radical right of entry and establishment for all regional nationals dissolved back to visa free 
visit access as expelling foreigners proved politically popular in economic crisis periods 
notably Ghana in the late 1960’s and 1970’s and Nigeria in the 1990’s but even more 
frequently, though on a lesser scale, in several Francophone states. Part of the problem  
was that Nigeria’s surpluses and thus the regional development fund evaporated and 
Nigerian industry proved both largely uncompetitive and domestic market fixated. Until 
late in the 1980’s, ECOWAS did not address security issues substantively either at macro 
level (e.g. coup prevention/exile activities) or at household (e.g. refugees/response to 
drought).
10. The East African Community (1967) had a history dating back to the 1920’s and com mon 
rail, port, posts and telecommunications, airline, tax collection, research and education 
institutions and - until just before the transition from EACSO/EACM to EAC - a com mon 
currency. There was little divergence of view on its providing overall net gains but 
vehem ent difference in views both on static interterritorial distribution and on dynamic 
(growth) distribution impact. The one empirical study attempted suggested net gains of 
2% to 3% of regional GDP, dominated by joint public utilities, with K enya’s net gain 
larger than the regional, U ganda’s within the margin of error of estim ation and Tanzania’s 
negative. Kenya’s own official public view was that it subsidised its partners statically but
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perhaps gained dynamically while Tanzania and (less clearly) Uganda saw themselves as 
present losers but potential gainers. Therefore restructuring was mutually agreed to be a 
necessity for survival and a potential means both to sustainable regionalism and enhanced *
national economic development.
11. Restructuring - via a three member country dialogue at Ministerial level under an 
independent Chairman and concluded at a Heads of State Summit - involved a detailed 
formal treaty (with an independent dispute settlement procedure - in the event unused), 
two major excisions (the University of East Africa and - nominally separately - the East 
African Currency Board and its EA shilling), two substantial additions (the East African 
Development Bank and Eastern African M anagement Institute - both of which have 
survived EAC), substantial relocation of headquarters (previously all in Kenya) to achieve 
revenue/expenditure balance territorially, interim infant industry tariffs within EAC for 
Tanzania and Uganda and an EADB investment share weighted to assist their 
manufacturing sectors to catch up.
12 Before the Amin coup in Uganda and the external balance crises of the mid 1970’s, EAC 
looked to be succeeding. Tanzania appeared to have achieved static net gains (largely by 
reallocation) and substantially more dynamic export growth to Kenya. Negotiations had 
been begun for the accession of Zambia, Burundi, Ethiopia and Somalia with at least the 
first and second making substantial progress. Additional sectoral institutions in 
consultancy and balanced industrial promotion were also well on the way to agreem ent
13 The Amin coup doomed EAC - albeit actual break-up was six years later. EA C’s dynamic 
had been triangular. Two axes Kenya-Uganda and Kenya-Tanzania were economic 
relations with Kenya the stronger party in each (more so vis-a-vis Uganda which had no 
other viable route to the sea) and were balanced by the third which was political between 
Tanzania and Uganda (who had no substantial direct economic links) to counter Kenyan 
economic dominance. W hile Tanzania agreed to work with Uganda at practical level 
(especially in EAC) it effectively never de ju re  recognised the Amin regime. While many 
Uganda officials remained in post and some Ministers were familiar figures, Am in’s lack of 
interest in economic issues and violent reaction to initiatives by others meant Uganda 
could only deal with day to day business or - with a serious lag - crises not new directions
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nor strategy. Trust and momentum were lost and strains in the mid 1970’s over forex 
transfers built up rather than being resolved.
14. Other zones of the Continent can be sketched more briefly. Despite efforts including 
tentative institutionalisation, Mahgrebin economic sub-regionalism never really got off the 
ground. Partly this turned on tensions among the potential member states, partly on 
alternative non-regional zonal economic scenarios (Mediterranean - i.e. EU - African and 
other littoral and Arab - i.e. North African - W est Asian) and partly on Egyptian interest in 
Africa being both o f moderate intensity and of substantial regional diversity (i.e.
Khartoum, Lagos, Nairobi, Accra, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Dakar almost as m uch as the 
Mahgreb).
15. The Horn (Sudan-Ethiopia/Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia/Somaliland) has not been perceived 
as a sub-region economically nor, until recently, politically. As a Northern extension o f the 
Preferential Trade Area of Eastern and Southern Africa (to which at one point all o f its 
states adhered) it has been a technical and political minefield rather than a functioning 
zone.
16. The Indian Ocean island economies hardly constitute a zone by themselves as their links 
are either alm ost entirely European (Seychelles, Reunion, Comores) or European and 
Mainland African (Mauritius, Madagascar). Mauritius did become an active
PTA/COM ESA (and now SADC) member for trade expansion reasons; M adagascar 
(distracted by domestic instability and a certain ambivalence as to its Africaness) has n o t
17. Equatorial Africa ended colonialism with two quasi economic (or at least trade and 
monetary) unions - UDEAC among the five former French colonies and Congo Belge- 
Ruanda-Urundi in the Belgian sphere. The latter broke up at independence in 1960 and 
attempts to float successors (e.g. the High Economic Community of the G reat Lakes) 
never had much reality. UDEAC lost members for a variety of reasons and eroded more 
than its Francophone W est African parallels albeit the central bank/common currency
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survived and even added Equatorial Guinea. The 1980’s attempt to create a Central 
African Economic Community (modelled on ECOWAS) achieved treaties and vestigial 
offices but no substantive reality.
18. The South African economic zone - with occupied Namibia and the ex High Commission 
Territories (BLS) as the core and Mozambique, the ex-Central African Federation states as 
the inner periphery and Angola, (then) Zaire, M adagascar, Mauritius, Comoros as the 
outer periphery - was relatively strong but hardly Pan African (classical or otherwise). 
Indeed it was increasingly used (sometimes to the frustration of its economic technocratic 
managers) quite overtly in the opposite cause of making Southern Africa safe and 
profitable for apartheid.
19. Other nominally regional economic groupings were either mini in nominal and micro in 
actual economic coverage, e.g. Liberia-Sierra Leone-Guinea, or overtly special purpose,
e.g. Senegal and Kagera Basin authorities among those with a water/communication/land 
use focus based on coordinated development of specified cross frontier areas. These did 
not per se conflict with broader sub-regional groupings, but nor were they logically 
building blocks toward a deeper broader dynamic. The African Development Bank 
might have played such a role but did not, apparently as a result of three factors:
a. it never articulated and gave programmatic content to its endorsement of economic 
regionalism and, indeed, only began to analyse it in any detail at the very end of the
1980’s;
b. was repeatedly riven by inter African, African - External member and general lending 
programme viability/efficiency challenges;
c. as a result never being very clearly seen as an actor in sub-regional economic 
regionalism even though some sub-regional bodies (notably SADCC/SADC) thought it 
had a vocation for such a role and should articulate and implement one as did some 
senior ADB personnel.
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SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION STRUGGLE - PAN AFRICAN  
RENAISSANCE 1961-1980
1. The one area in which Pan African rhetoric and the self reliance - self determination - self 
respect themes remained alive throughout in an all African and/or Sub-Regional focus was 
the Southern African Liberation Struggle. The reasons at one level are obvious - at least 
emotionally and in public pronouncements African leaders and states were all committed to 
completing decolonisation and coordinated action among Liberation M ovements and 
neighbouring independent states was important irrespective of the subsequent projected 
balance of nationalism and regionalism. An additional factor turned on Mwalimu 
N yerere’s and Tanzanians’ more generally being more concerned about completion of 
liberation and more committed to trying to forge regionalism even at the price o f some de 
fac to  transfer of powers than has been typical either of Presidents or peoples.
2. The most relevant phase of this continuation and latter renaissance of classic Pan 
Africanism began in 1961 with the independence of Tanzania, moved forward structurally 
in 1980 with the inauguration of SADCC and again in 1994-95 with the entry of the New 
South Africa into the regional economic arrangements (by then SADC) and the 1995-96 
transformation of the Front line States into a household to national security organisation 
more overtly linked to SADC than had been the case of FLS/SADCC interaction.
3. From independence Tanzania provided bases for Liberation M ovements - initially primarily 
Zambian, Mozambican, South African, Namibian and to a lesser extent Zimbabwean and 
Angolan. W hatever the initial debate on the provision of bases for armed action, the 
Portuguese concluded it by a policy of no negotiations with Frelimo and repeated (if tiny 
and strategically useless) armed raids into Tanzania. Because of its clear and sustained 
commitment, Tanzania became central to the advance of independence in Southern African 
at the operational level, to OAU efforts to back it via the Liberation Com m ittee (based in 
Dar es Salaam and Tanzanian led) and in building up the Front Line States. These 
comprised Tanzania plus the states in which liberation movements won pow er plus 
Botswana - which had a less fraught evolution - but minus M alawi - whose President 
Kamuzu Banda was little interested in further liberation (regionally or at home) once he 
was President (presently President for Life) of an independent Malawi.
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4. By their nature the FLS (including their de fac to  associate members - SWAPO, ANC and
«
earlier FRELIMO, MPLA and both major Zimbabwean Liberation Movements) were
engaged in coordinated and/or unified action. Initially their views on regionalism, while i
positive, were very general and vague and their explorations toward wider aspects of
regional security and good governance once minority rule was ended vaguer still.
5. In the late 1970’s - partly sparked by the trauma of 1973-74 global economic crises shock 
impacts on Southern Africa, the FLS began to consider building up a framework of 
economic coordination (including joint approaches to, agenda for and negotiations with 
external funding partners). These were seen from the start as de facto  the economic wing 
of the FLS with the two main areas of dialogue whether they should be freestanding or 
overtly part of the FLS structure and w hether non-FLS Southern African states (Lesotho,
Swaziland, Malawi) should be members.
6. Because of its origins this approach to economic regionalism was always overtly political 
economic - including reducing and defending against South African economic penetration 
of, and near hegemony over, neighbouring economies. This put it potentially at odds with 
ECA’s much more technocratic Addis to Gaborone (gradually expanded to Cape to Cairo, 
or at least Khartoum) preferential trade area to common market to community project 
whose origins dated to the early 1960’s but which was revived in the mid and late 1970’s.
The Northern, Central and Island PTA states were not integrally involved in the liberation 
struggle, coordination beyond com merce (unless on a smorgesbjord basis) was easy to 
envisage for Greater Southern Africa (through Tanzania and economically, albeit not 
politically then Zaire) and for Greater East Africa (Kenya-Uganda-Rwanda-Burundi- 
Tanzania) but less so among the two foci and still less adding the Indian Ocean states and 
the Horn. Further ECA had arguably tried too hard and been too up front on the issue, 
limiting perceived domestic involvement and commitment both at political and senior 
official levels.
7. However until the very end of the 1970’s, FLS economic regional thinking was very 
general and had no real articulated econom ic analysis or economic strategy content.
Further until 1978 it was somewhat hampered by Tanzania’s economic regionalism policy 
capacity being focused on the ultimately doomed effort to save the East African 
Community. In addition the heritage of the EAC the Rhodesias-Nyasaland economic
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union, the South African monetary and customs unions and “Portugal in A frica” econom ic 
‘unification’ meant that political commitment was tempered by fears it could go very 
wrong and end as a disunifying and destabilising force.
SELF RELIANCE AND SECURITY: Liberation and The Road To SADCC
1. A drawing together of security and classic Pan Africanism more generally with econom ic 
regionalism evolved in Southern African over the 1970’s culminating in the formal 
launching of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference in April 1980. 
The OAU and especially its Liberation Committee had always held to classic Pan 
Africanism (in a sense because Southern Africa was the last frontier of the external 
minority rule against which early Pan Africanism had struggled). Tanzania had backed and 
hosted the main Liberation Movements politically and to a degree militarily and grouped 
five of the newly independent states (Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Angola, and 
parallel to SADCC’s emergence Zimbabwe) into the Frontline States as a regional 
liberation/military security coordination and support group.
2. Tanzania had also pursued bilateral economic cooperation agreements - of substantial 
scope and substance with Zambia and to a lesser extent Mozambique, though m uch less so 
with respect to Botswana or Angola let alone Lesotho. However, these w hile consistent 
with the FLS were initially parallel in nature. The Tanzania-Zambia rail, road haulage and 
pipe line ventures were integral to Zambia’s economic, political and military survival 
following Rhodesia’s illegal declaration of independence, but did not form part o f any 
broader political economic cum security strategy nor were they closely linked to 
arrangements with Mozambique, Botswana and Angola. Indeed Tanzania’s approach to 
regionalism in respect to Zambia was to encourage and to back its negotiating for 
accession to EAC.
3. In the last years of the 1970’s this piecemeal approach was transformed into a m uch more 
holistic one in which SADCC became de facto  the economic wing of the FLS and, at least 
at heads of state and senior ministerial level, economic strategy and program m ing cam e to 
be perceived as integrally related to and part of liberation and security. By its context,
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membership and objectives SADCC was far more overtly political economic than any of its 
post colonial predecessors (or than PTA). Four strands contributed to this evolution:
a. the growing realisation that liberation support depended on relatively strong econom ies 
and independent (of the South African systems) transport and communications with 
independent neighbours and the outside world;
b. the break-up of the EAC and CACM the which left Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
free to look for new regional arrangements and ones more related to national strategies 
than their predecessors, combined with Botswana’s (and Swaziland’s) desire to loosen 
South African hegemony over its economy;
c. Mozambique (and to a lesser degree Angola) was concerned with security including 
access to soft, long term Northwestern finance which its declining to join the ACP,
IMF or World Bank prejudiced and saw regional economic diplomacy jointly with its 
neighbours as highly relevant while Lesotho - whatever the limits of its possible 
economic links with the non-contiguous SADCC core - saw a regional economic 
grouping as a morale and diplomatic boost and a less provocative vehicle for 
expressing its Africaness and commitment to liberation than FLS membership.
d. An independent group of public servants (notably Bernard Chidzero, David Anderson 
and Amon Nsekela) and academicians (including the author) had begun formulating a 
strategy for coordinated economic regionalism particularly in respect to external 
financial mobilisation and allocation (thus the second C in SADCC) initially to lead to 
joint ECA-EEC sponsored conference. When misunderstandings ended the ECA link, 
they turned - via Presidents Nyerere, Khama and Kaunda - to the FLS as potential sole 
sponsor.
4. During 1988-89 the endorsem ent of three FLS Heads of State led to a FLS Foreign 
Ministers’ decision to convene a senior official meeting in Gaborone which led to a 
Ministerial Council (chaired by Botswana’s then Vice President Quett Masire) and an 
official meeting (chaired by Tanzania’s then High Commissioner to London Amon 
Nsekela) in Arusha to approve broad goals/strategy and a basic statement of purpose 
document followed by a meeting for dialogue with invited guests (basically potential 
national and international agency cooperating partners) hosted by President Khama. In
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April 1991 SADCC was founded at Heads of State/Government level with the Lusaka 
Declaration and appended heads of programme and in November it held its first meeting 
with external supporters based on an initial set of coordinated key projects, strategies and 
studies agreed at SADCC official and ministerial meetings.
5. The prefounding and early history of SADCC are marked by six elements less prominent in 
most other sub-regional initiatives:
a. self determination in the sense of government (FLS) set strategy and priority 
instruments with little dependence on standard economic union theory or experience;
b. self reliance in the sense o f main policy guideline determination and project 
approval by ministers responsible to heads of state based on official (national and 
regional) articulation and - on occasion - proposals with no institutional technical 
assistance at strategic level and only three FLS chosen key external advisers (one 
diplomacy, one administration, one strategy and policy articulation and analysis);
c. a premise that promotion o f common interests commonly perceived to require or to 
be pursued more effectively by sub-regional coordination - not trade barrier reduction - 
was the appropriate central goal of a regional grouping;
d. resulting in a multi sectoral approach in which production (including knowledge, 
transport and communications) coordination took precedence over trade barrier 
reduction because trade was seen as the consequential handmaid o f production not its 
causative mistress;
e. overt grounding of econom ic instruments in a political econom ic context and four 
central strategic goals (reducing unilateral external dependence - especially but not 
only on RSA; building mutually beneficial regional arrangements; mobilising and 
allocating resources to these ends; building up an economic and political economic 
context of external support by dialogue and diplomacy);
f. as a result launching SADCC with a declaration of context, strategic intent, main  
initial potential sectors and instruments for initial action (The Lusaka Declaration) 
with an appended list of main activities for the next year (amended annually).
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Because of the commonly perceived common interest theme and the “deep” sectoral 
approach (vs. a broad shallow trade barrier reduction one) freedom to build up as 
needed on the basis of experience was perceived to make a full blown normal Treaty 
structure premature - albeit the drafters of the Lusaka Declaration never expected it to 
be SADCC’s basic constitution for a decade.
6. Less overtly the SADCC process took account of governance in several senses:
a. states to whom the political economic context of apartheid at bay and striking back 
was peripheral were perceived as unlikely to have an adequate array of common 
economic concerns;
b. states perceived as friendly to, or tolerant of dealings with, South Africa were ruled 
out if on the margins of the core Southern African region;
c. some (implicit) standards of decent governance were seen as a prerequisite to 
membership and in particular military governance and coups were viewed very 
negatively.
7. Despite external pressures on its behalf and an expressed desire to join Zaire was viewed 
as totally excluded on the second and third counts and Kenya- had it then desired to join - 
would have been seen as ruled out on all three. The actual debate concerned the three 
non FLS members (Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi). Lesotho’s internal governance 
patterns did give rise to some reservations as - given its location - did the limited 
applicability of many (not all e.g. air transport, telecommunications, food security)
SADCC programmatic instruments. However, it was overtly on the side of liberation and 
saw SADCC membership as politically and diplomatically useful so no serious issue of 
exclusion arose. Swaziland was perceived by some as more problematic as a result of its 
diplomacy and political economy of balancing among its larger neighbours to achieve some 
freedom of manoeuvre. However, M ozam bique’s firm endorsement on the basic of 
economic efficacy of SADCC’s transport sector and on that of strengthening Swazi 
distancing from South Africa were accepted by other FLS states. The most doubtful case 
was Malawi (“Hastings’ Bandastan” as some termed it). It was clearly at some levels 
allied with RSA, hosted an externally manipulated guerrilla force (RENAMO) seeking to 
overthrow an FLS government (M ozambique); had border disputes with two other FLS
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members (Zambia, Tanzania) and advocated the deconstruction of central and northern 
Mozambique to create Rombezia ( ‘Greater M alawi’). However, M ozambique, and less 
energetically Tanzania, argued that the economic logic of inclusive regionalism was 
bolstered by the political economic that a coordinated transport sector would influence 
“FLS locked” Malawi while the SADCC structures and processes would reinforce the 
elements in the Malawi public service and cabinet who - for whatever reasons - opposed 
the pro-South African and especially the pro-Renamo policy stance.
SECURITY RECONSIDERED AND REDEFINED: From The Beira C orridor To
Kinshasa
1. SADCC/SADC have always been quite overtly about security: economic security, the 
economic defence of military security, economic diplomacy in support of (as well as 
parallel to) political, food security in the face of calamity (drought) and catastrophe (war), 
internal security in the sense of minimum standards of governance, external security in the 
sense of actions of neighbours (whether overtly externally aggressive or not) threatening 
the economic and social as well as political and military security of Member States. Until 
the early 1990’s this rather protean (or in more complimentary terms holistic) definition o f 
security was implicit and intuitive built up from the “case law” of urgent strategic decisions 
and tactical programming to defend against threats to security. This com bination o f quite 
general principles, strategies to address overriding challenges to them, im m ediate concrete 
action and subsequent reflection, revision and coordination of themes is the m ain way in 
which SADCC can fairly said to have been pragmatic. (It was also pragmatic in preferring 
dialogue to shouting and dropping proposals for instruments which led to internal discord 
(e.g. an attempt to unify currencies) or fixed, uniform external disinterest (e.g. a Sub- 
Regional Development Bank combining direct lending - technical assistant and m erchant 
banking).
2. In part this was a result of the sharp change in South African strategy over 1979-81.
1977-79 had been marked by a lull in South African support for RENAMO and in 
aggressive action by it and its ally UNITA in Angola. Economic pressures via delays in 
transport, shifting cargo away from Maputo, reducing allowed hiring of Southern African
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workers, ending the gold arrangement on remittances to Mozambique (a long running one 
but not very large in term of subsidy until the end of the 1960’s when gold soared above 
the $35 an ounce rate and one presumably allowed to run up to $200 million a year to 
support Portuguese resistance to FRELIMO, not Mozambican territorial development) 
and manipulation of trade volumes and prices were - accurately over 1977-80 - the 
perceived threats which SADCC sought to counter. In 1979-80 South African reorganised 
its economic offensive into the ‘Greater Southern Africa Co-Prosperity Sphere’ 
launched at Carleton House after SADCC’s Arusha Conference and perhaps more 
significantly added a military/political destabilisation front to create a unified Forward  
Strategy to make Southern Africa safe and profitable for apartheid. As a result the 
tactic against the 1980 SADCC Consultative Conference in Maputo was a counter forum  
in Mbabane but to the 1981 Blantyre Conference was armed attacks on oil facilities and 
navigation aids at Beira (then one of Malawi’s two main ports).
3. SADCC adjusted - the transport and communications sectors’ work rapidly becam e 
focused on creating (especially in respect to ground satellite stations) or 
repairing/renewing (especially in respect to the rail and port corridors to Dar es Salaam, 
Maputo, Ncala, Luanda and - most crucial - Beira) to maintain or achieve secure routes 
among SADCC states and with the outside world bypassing South Africa. The 
project clusters were economically analysed and economically sound (the South African 
routes were longer and had greater satellite and port bottlenecks) but the overriding 
concerns were to avert Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola and avoid Malawi, Swaziland 
and (to a lesser degree) Zambia being left totally dependent on South African road-rail- 
port-telecoms links.
4. The military/economic interaction shows most clearly in the Defence of the Beira 
Corridor, Zimbabwe’s key independent route to the sea (road, rail, pipeline). Defence 
coordination involved M ozambique, Zimbabwe and at a later stage Tanzania. Diplomatic 
focused on pressuring M alawi to end rest, relaxation, reprovisioning and regrouping bases 
for Renamo; economic on mobilising resources and personnel to overcome 1972-79 
deferred maintenance and damage from South African/Renamo raids to keep port, 
pipeline, road and rail rolling and - via the mixed (public/private, Zimbabwe/Mozambique) 
Beira Corridor Authority build up the corridor’s economy. Each of the coordinated fronts
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was successful - the 1987 battles outside Quelimane and at the Sena Bridge on the 
Zambesi defeating the Buffalo Brigade/Renamo forces were the eastern parallel to South 
A frica’s defeat in the skies over Cuito Canavale in the West, while in 1986-87 Malawi 
ended large scale RENAMO basing facilities. And - central to the SADCC front - the 
corridor traffic rolled on. These outcomes it must be said were close run and without the 
regional collaboration via FLS/SADCC the fall of Beira, the blockade of Zimbabwe and 
even the launch of Rombezia (Malawi-Northern Mozambique) might well have happened.
5. SADCC also sought to address more directly economic security - national and 
household - in respect to food. 1985-87 efforts at Annual Consultative Conferences had 
limited results. In part this related to apparently separate (or at best parallel) national and 
regional programmes, in part to weaknesses on most proposals and - perhaps most key - 
the non fit between Consultative Conference and emergency hunger appeal timings and 
between the bilateral and multilateral officials at SADCC meetings and these who actually 
dealt with emergency/humanitarian relief. By the time of the G reat Drought of 1991-92 
and the Great Dearth (and prospective Great Famine) of 1992-93, SAD CC’s Food 
Security Unit had learned from experience. It had the earliest definitive data for the region 
and for several countries; coordinated holistic national appeals and launched a awareness 
and mobilisation campaign early in 1992. This led to earlier international assessment (and 
confirmation of most SADCC estimates and analysis) and an early donor conference 
cosponsored by SADCC and the UN which achieved just enough grain just in time to avert 
mass starvation. A parallel SADCC-RSA (by then en route to the New South Africa) 
transport coordination group achieved substantial logistical success- only the routes via 
South Africa (overprogrammed by donors against SADCC/SARR advice) developed 
serious bottlenecks.
6. During the SADC period water cam e to be a security focus. At household level this 
relates to pre-emptive maintenance of extant facilities and building up more drought secure 
sources notably in the Limpopo Valley and for Beira and Maputo. Nationally it turns on 
water agreements on transborder rivers and potentially, coordinated river basin 
management. Because Southern Africa faces growing overall water shortages such 
agreements (specifically set out as a sector pi ity with dated progress targets) are 
essential to averting severe tensions and- pot. ly, war. The problems were realised
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earlier, but as the Orange, Zambesi and Kunene River clusters involved both occupied 
Namibia and South Africa; the Okavango basin occupied Namibia and the Mozambique- 
Swaziland-Vaal and Limpopo basin ones South Africa, no action was seen as possible 
earlier.
7. Cross border cooperation against crime - especially the arms, drugs and stolen vehicle 
trades - was largely impossible prior to the 1990’s. By 1992 it had begun on a tentative 
basis and by 1994 illegal mass immigration was also seen as a common concern.
8. However, both at governmental and civil society level, a perception had developed that 
without household physical and econom ic security national crim e and massive 
population movement security concerns could not be handled. The corridors of 
development approach (notably M aputo-South Africa) was intended, at least in part, to 
meet the household level challenge by increasing deep poverty areas’ livelihood 
development possibilities (in southern Mozambique in the Maputo Corridor case).
9. A parallel rethinking related to acceptable governance. SADCC had always been 
concerned about a degree of “ like mindedness” and minimum acceptable governance 
standards. In particular it was very anti military coups - seriously considering excluding 
the 1986 Lesotho government. The 1994 Lesotho military coup with a (usurpers’) royal 
face caused it to act decisively. No SADC state recognised the coupsters and SADC - like 
its members - continued to recognise the elected government. In its support South Africa 
(and in parallel its civil society especially the trade union sector) gradually tightened an 
economic blockade while Botswana-Zimbabwe-South Africa negotiated a non-violent 
restoration of the elected government. The contrast with the parallel - except for regional 
response - case of Gambia is instructive. However, the very special conditions (an elected 
government which could credibly continue to be recognised and the ease of a total 
blockade) were probably not fully recognised - thus ECOWAS’s problems in attempting a 
parallel 1997 exercise in support of the elected government of Sierra Leone against a 
mutinous army/internal rebel coup.
10. In 1993-94 SADC and its m em ber states had extensive dialogue and discussion sessions 
with each other and (especially but not only in South Africa and Namibia) with civil 
society groups culminating in the 1994 W indhoek Conference. Here the definition of
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security as household to regional and survival/livelihood to military and the need for a 
holistic multi-sectoral approach addressing base causes as well as symptoms were broadly 
agreed. Subsequent institutional development has been more tentative - perhaps 
deliberately. A council system (official/ministerial) reporting to Heads of State has been 
set up - nominally parallel to rather than an integral part of SADC but involving the same 
countries and serviced by a secretariat in the Gaborone SADC headquarters. It is 
composed of Foreign-Defence-Home Affairs (Police, Immigration) representatives. 
However, Food Security and W ater clearly also have roles in the broad concept of security 
as do corridor projects and other SADC programmes intended to raise livelihood 
opportunities of poor households.
11. In practice the security action has been either low profile (crime prevention, immigration 
management) or fronted by a single state (usually South Africa or Zimbabwe) speaking 
on behalf of all (or most). The 1995 Commonwealth decisions on Nigeria were in large 
part made possible by Zimbabwe, subsequently backed by South Africa. The m otivation 
appears to have been two fold - the denial of decent governance to and im position of 
military tyranny on any Africans threatens all Africans, and African self respect requires a 
clear stand by African states (not just outsiders) on the Abacha regime. O ver 1995-1997 
the SADC security group became increasingly involved in the Great Lakes crisis and the 
revolutionary ouster of Mobutu. Here, there were precise, SADC concerns - the 
economies and military security of Tanzania, Zambia and Angola were threatened (Mobutu 
was a firm UNITA backer and vica versa). The South African leadership role in respect to 
regional ‘m ediation’ in respect to Zaire (as it then was) clearly aimed at reducing econom ic 
strains on and military risks to the three member states and equally clearly saw as speedy a 
handover of pow er (with the lowest possible level of bloodshed) by M obutu as a necessary 
component in achieving that goal. How much influence (e.g. by offering cooperation 
and/or membership) on President Kabila’s Congo government South Africa and/or SADC 
have and or can achieve remains unclear, but Mobutu and his genocidal Hutu revanchist 
allies no longer threaten Angola, Zambia and Tanzania while U NITA’s ability to revert to 
war once again is crippled.
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PARALLEL SECURITY VENTURES: The Horn and the Freed Slave States
1. The return of SADCC/SADC to security considerations turned in part on leadership at 
Presidential, Ministerial and official levels and in part on the particular context of the 
Southern African Liberation Struggle. It was also facilitated by the definition of purpose 
as furtherance of common interests perceived as such by its member states and of 
structuring integral state involvement into central decision making and sectoral programme 
articulation. Certainly it was these characteristics (together with its clear linkage to the 
history of liberation) which facilitated rapid South African accession after the change of 
government and kept a real - however uneven among sectors and countries - economic 
coordination toward integration economic dynamic moving. However, SADCC/SADC 
was not unique - the challenges of the 1980’s and 1990’s have included a rising number of 
civil wars with dire sub-regional consequences because of spillover (refugees, violence) 
impact on their neighbours. W hile COMESA (perhaps surprisingly) has not sought to act 
on these altered realities, ECOW AS has, as has the Horn-Kenya Intergovernmental Group 
Against Drought and for Development which was initially a (decreasingly effective) locust, 
quelea bird and drought com bating body associated with food security.
2. ECOWAS moved into security operations first in Liberia and then in Sierra Leone 
although between the two it notably failed to do so in Gambia in 1994 where its action 
would almost certainly have led to the relatively speedy and non violent restoration of 
SSA’s longest running multi party election chosen democratic government. The road to 
security operations - including, unlike SADC, deployment of substantial multi country 
armed forces much more willing to take proactive and reactive combat roles than UN 
peacekeeping forces - is perhaps typical of ECOWAS dynamics. The initiative in both 
cases was Nigerian (as apparently was the key decision not to act in the Gambian case) and 
the doubtful, bystander or in some cases counter acting states were Cote d ’Ivoire and 
Senegal albeit Ghana and Guinea were prominent Nigerian allies and the Cote d ’Ivoire 
(under pressure of massive refugee flows and episodic spillover of violence) came to 
acquiesce in ECOWAS action albeit not providing significant personnel. Indeed the 
inaction on Gambia probably turned on Senegal’s clear (if misguided) preference for the 
coupsters it did not know over President Jawara whom it did know in respect to halting
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entrepot (as seen from Banjual) smuggling (in Dakar’s optic) trade and facilitating action 
against the Casamance rebels.
3. Nigeria initially intervened unilaterally in Liberia to prop up President Doe - the sergeant 
being a friend of Nigeria’s then military leaders. As the situation deteriorated Nigeria 
sought ECOWAS backing (or cover) and adopted a less partisan political stance. The 
tortuous series of negotiations and (oft broken) agreements among Liberian fractions and 
the oscillating degrees of competence and effectiveness of the ECOW AS forces 
(eventually OAU and UN blessed and partly Northwestern state funded) did lead to a 
truce, partial disarmament and a reasonably free and fair 1997 election with a very clear 
outcome - ironically by the leader (Charles Taylor) Nigeria had initially intervened to 
block.
4. Sierra Leone again featured Nigerian led involvement albeit Ghana and Guinea were very 
keen on action because of the refugee crises the civil war imposed on them. The stepped 
up operations in 1996-97 appear to be a Nigerian response to international condem nation 
of its military governance. Protecting forces did facilitate a free and fair election but 
before any truce agreement/negotiating frame with the RUF. The subsequent 1996 
agreement broke down when the Sierra Leone army staged at least its 10th m ajor and 6th 
successful coup. ECOWAS continued to recognise President Kabbah (in exile in Conakry 
but with village defence militias in the field in Sierra Leone), to hold bases in Freetown 
(notably the international airport) and to seek (by a mix of military and negotiating) means 
to pressure the mutineers to abandon their new RUF allies and accept the return of the 
lawful government
5. Liberia and Sierra Leone have special histories. Both were established as homes for freed 
slaves (from the USA in Liberia and from the UK and - especially - from slaveships 
interdicted by the Royal Navy in Sierra Leone). Both developed highly polarised socio 
political structures pitting Afro-Americans, and Creoles respectively against ‘tribals’. In 
Liberia, the Doe Coup and its bloody aftermath were the definitive overthrow o f the Afro- 
American establishment. In the Sierra Leone case, Creole political pow er ended 
(peaceably - by election) in the 1960’s. In both initial revolts and subsequent changes of 
government were army led (from the blocking of Siaka Stevens’ election in the 1970’s 
through the overthrow of President Kabbah in 1997 in Sierra Leone and from  the Doe
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coup through a confused series of army fraction and semi ethnic group militias in Liberia).
In each case good governance was totally absent - indeed had never existed in Liberia - 
and civil governance greatly eroded and manipulated to serve corrupt and corrupting 
interests even before the wars of the last decade. In both countries the actual practice of 
war has been brutal, indiscipined and humanly/socially corrosive. W hether ECOWAS has 
addressed this context and evolved a strategy for helping newly elected governments to 
restore good governance - including basic service delivery and total demobilisation of all 
armed bands (most certainly including the present so called Sierra Leone army) and 
training new loyal, professional police and army units is very doubtful. W hile the same 
criticism can be made of the UN, the EU and the USA and other bilateral donors, it 
remains an apparent weakness in ECO W A S’s security vision that it has to date only two 
major features - armed force to create a semi cessation of hostilities and a pact among 
armed fractions leading to an internationally assisted and monitored election. That, 
experience suggests is not, by itself, enough to secure more than a truce.
6. The IGAD case is somewhat different from the ECOWAS because IGAD was previously 
an (almost non functional) special purpose group focused on drought response and 
insect/bird pest combating. The tentative renaissance as a security promotion forum (and, 
almost as a side-show the drafting of an economic community treaty even though all of its 
members are also COMESA members) arose out of the long running civil wars in the 
Sudan and the collapse of civil governance in Somalia and more particularly the massive 
flows of refugees and, at least potentially, of massive armed conflict across borders.
7. IGAD has held a number of series of official, ministerial and - incomplete - summit 
meetings focusing on dialogue to achieve a lasting settlement of the Sudanese civil war and 
to secure the re-emergence of recognisable (in both senses) territory wide civil governance 
in Somalia. All have broken down and there is little evidence of better future outcomes.
8. In fact an unofficial grouping of Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, the de fac to  Republic of 
Somaliland (the old British Somaliland) and the Sudanese alliance of the southern 
Liberation movements and the main Northern Democratic parties has become much more a 
sub regional security group for the Horn than IGAD. (Uganda is not directly involved in 
respect to Somalia/Somaliland and Somaliland is not involved in respect to the Sudan.
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The Khartoum regime and the Somalian factions are not members and Som aliland only a 
partial de fa c to  one.)
9. This composition makes what might be called the Kampala-Addis-Asmara group more 
analogous to the FLS vis-^-vis South Africa than to a sub-regional group addressing the 
security concerns of its members.
a. in respect to the Sudan the military/minority Islamic fraction regime is perceived as the 
main obstacle to peace in the Sudan and security for both its people and its neighbours;
b. in Somalia/Somaliland the government of Somaliland is perceived as a valid 
governm ent (and useful economic partner) whether as a separate state or part of a 
confederal Somalia; the irredentist Somali groups attacking Ethiopia (especially 
Ethiopia’s Somali Region and its leaders) as mortal enemies and the rest of the Somalia 
fractions as certainly part of the problem and only dubiously part of any stable answer;
c. resulting in provision of bases, logistics, supplies and diplomatic prom otion for the 
Sudanese alliance with the overt aim of assisting it to liberate the Sudan;
d. de fa c to  recognition of Somaliland;
e. a policy of attacking bases for raids into Ethiopia with encouragement for negotiation 
toward a confederal dynamic among other Somalia fractions.
10. In the case of the Sudan (and of Somaliland at least for the foreseeable future) a clear 
strategy exists. It requires a change (a violent change) of government in the Sudan. This 
is clearly inconsistent with the historic OAU stance but not necessarily w ith the views of its 
present Secretary General and a number of its members on how progress tow ard Horn 
peace and security might be furthered. The twin horrors of genocide in R w anda and the 
intolerably protracted death of the Mobutu regime in (then) Zaire have vastly eroded the 
conviction and the intellectual foundations of the “internal affairs” doctrine as has the 
manifest fact that at least Liberia and Somalia have lacked any plausible pretence at 
national governments for well over half a decade.
11. The lack of clarity (or at least de facto  transparency) on means in the case o f Som alia is 
arguably a weakness but equally arguably a strength. No alliance com parable to the main
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Southern Liberation Movement - main Islamic fraction (Mahdism) - main Democratic 
Parties one in the case of the Sudan exists. Ethiopia has neither the means nor the desire 
to impose a settlement and its overt backing of a fraction (even, or perhaps especially if 
handled largely by Ethiopian Somalis) would run a high risk of being counterproductive. 
(Even in the Sudanese case, Ethiopia has deliberately encouraged Eritrea to provide the 
base for the de fa c to  government in exile and to be the leading diplomatic proponent of the 
front.) Quarantining, attacking bases for raids, averting the spread of chaos to Somaliland 
and quietly encouraging discourse among fractions is arguably the least bad strategy 
available for the Horn proper.
ECONOMIC MEANS IN FLUX -1980/1996
1. The 1980’s saw significant progress in two sub regional economic organisations - SADCC 
and PTA - and their transformation into economic communities - SADC and COMESA
- at the turn of the decade. ECOW AS and the Francophone West African groupings 
survived but the former failed to launch a serious economic coordination programme or 
achieve trade preferences while the latter continued trade - fiscal redistribution currency 
union activities but with a general perception of relative stagnation or decline at least until 
1994.
2. The fact that both relatively successful bodies were located in Eastern and Southern Africa 
suggests that, for whatever reasons this area was contextually better placed for 
regionalism. Further the reality that of the non-SADCC PTA members only Kenya and 
Mauritius and later Uganda were economically active (and that Mozambique and especially 
Angola economic involvement in trade was limited) suggests that an overriding condition 
was absence of domestic civil war and presence of a priority political economic motivation
- key makets for Kenya and M auritius and routes to the sea for Uganda. The two 
organisations were quite divergent in origins, overall approach and initial strategic 
instruments.
3. SADCC as discussed above was the product of the FLS with a focus on economic self 
determination, self reliance and security. Coordination of economic strategic and project 
clusters in transport, communications, food security, energy, animal disease control and
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agricultural research and extension were its core areas. Trade was somewhat latter in 
emerging with an articulated strategy and, when it did, focused on identifying 
complementarities, promoting commercial sector exchange of information, state facilitation 
of trade credit and harmonisation/simplification of customs-transit-interstate vehicle 
regulations, not on tariff preferences or commercial clearing arrangements. The reasons 
were complex:
a. to the extent the threats to economic (and political) survival were transport disruption 
and communications blockage or tapping, transport and communications maintenance 
and augmentation were a precondition both for trade and for survival:
b. more generally the physical, transport cost and information gap barriers to trade were 
perceived as more crucial than tariffs, while medium term swing credits and trade 
finance were thought to be key to reducing quota constructions;
c. and in the longer term SADCC worked on the basis that coordination and expansion of 
production combined with pooling of information would be validated (not caused) by 
trade; and
d. PTA ’s tariff preferences and commercial clearing were usable among SADCC states 
(except Botswana and, at that time, Angola) so that replication would waste effort and 
cause controversy.
4. SADCC also had substantial institutional and processual divergences from  PT A ’s 
standard central secretariat driven model. The driving forces in the official - ministerial - 
heads of state chain (advised at each level by the central and, where appropriate sectoral, 
secretariats) were the government members. Decisions were debated and drafts frequently 
amended, substituted or rejected as a matter of course. The central secretariat’s core staff 
(after two years of a Botswana seconded plus associated individuals interim  secretariat) 
was kept small and by 1988 comprised 100% citizens using consultants (citizen and 
outside world, individually chosen and ta provided) on special topics or reviews. The bulk 
of the staff were in sectoral units, each under the leadership of a member state with a 
priority interest in that sector. Staffs varied - dominantly citizens in agriculture and food 
security because Zimbabwe and Botswana had relevant professionals and funds to cover 
‘free’ secondment, mixed in energy (where Angola had funds but less specialised
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personnel) and largely (though not exclusively especially in respect to policy) expatriates in 
Transport and Communication (where Mozambique had limited citizen professionals and 
less funds). Central (and sectoral) secretariat work centred on articulating strategic and 
policy proposals and referring back for approval leading (especially in the sectors) to 
programme and project collection-evaluation-coordination leading to sectoral draft 
regional programmes for state approval. In addition information collection, public 
relations and diplomacy (e.g. mobilising project support, negotiating the EEC-SADCC 
compact which was the first giving an ACP region a real voice in allocation and use of 
EEC regional funding) were secretariat duties.
5. PTA focused on neo-classical official trade barrier reduction - tariffs, quotas, customs and 
transit documentation and procedures and commercial (90 day) trade balance clearing. 
Unlike ECOWAS (much less other nominal sub-regional groupings) it achieved a series of 
tariff reduction rounds, at least substantial quota easing, a clearing mechanism based in the 
Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe which did - with hiccups - clear and did cover the bulk of - 
rather narrowly defined - interstate current account balances and (albeit the driving force 
was UNCTAD and non-PTA SADCC states were involved in the exercise) at least 
significant customs, transit and interstate vehicle nomenclature forms and procedures 
harmonisation and simplification. In addition - after a false start via the old EADB (which 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania decided to reactivate on, and as, their own) it established a 
COMESA Trade Bank with not insignificant pledged resources. While interstate trade 
remained a low proportion of total external trade and most intra PTA trade was in a 
limited number of largely bilateral spokes centred on Harare and Nairobi, these 
achievements cannot fairly be described as negligible.
6. Outside trade PTA was less effective. Its attempts to create a regional transport and 
communications plan and a regional early warning system directly conflicted 
with/duplicated sectors in which SAD CC had functioning programmes. It did not focus on 
Indian Ocean shipping or coordination (merger?) of air transport where SADCC did little 
or nothing. The Mombasa and Dar es Salaam based Northern and Central Transit 
corridors to Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire and Uganda are sometimes claimed as a PTA 
achievement but in practice are the continuation of littoral/landlocked state forums, 
dialogues and programmes reaching back to the I960’s.
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7. Institutionally PTA had a relatively large and highly centralised secretariat which sought - 
via late presentation of information and production of decision texts which it clearly 
suggested should not be challenged or amended by states - to dominate the PTA decision 
taking process. This was ‘successful’ and did speed ‘decisions’, but left a rather low er 
level of state com m itm ent to the organisation or the ‘decided’ programmes than 
characterised SADCC.
8. Until the end of the 1980’s, SADCC and PTA clashed sharply on the appropriateness of 
external finance mobilisation and, therefore, the appropriateness of member/cooperating 
partner consultative conferences. PTA contended that involving outside sources o f finance 
in regional programming was inherently “neo-colonial” and that nationally agreed projects 
should be nationally financed (presumably with nationally negotiated external finance 
components). At times it suggested any other approach was fraudulent or subservient. 
While the view o f many SADCC officials as well as national officials and ministers that this 
was a xenophobic smokescreen to cover up PTA’s failure to unlock additional (or 
reallocated) finance for its programme may have been unfair, the exclusivist approach  
was never an option for SADCC:
a. to achieve a regional coordinated programme’s implementation required that 
additional resources be mobilised;
b. except for Botswana and - at some points in time - Angola, states could not m obilise  
additional dom estic resources and - except under special conditions - could not be 
expected to reallocate substantial sums from national to regional projects;
c. therefore it was essential to secure external financial commitments - both additional 
and reallocated to regionally agreed priorities and projects;
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d. which could only be done by combining regionally agreed programme/project 
priority packages (to avert donor-individual state disruption of regional project and 
location priorities - a source of bitter resentment in the old EAC) with full discourse 
with prospective funders at a SADCC managed regional consultative conference.
SADCC’s sectoral reach made the financial flow issue much more central to it than to PTA 
since trade barrier reduction, documentation harmonisation and simplification and 90 day 
clearing houses do not require resource comparable to transport and communications (in 
which expenditure on regional programme components was approaching $500 million a 
year by the mid 1990’s) or even food security (where 1992-93 external emergency aid to 
the regional probably exceeded $500 million).
9. The issue of extending ability to implement via external cooperation versus being 
coopted by outsiders is ultimately an empirical one. On that test SADCC/SADC have
“held the fort” :
a. clearly regionally oriented and coordinated programmes of expenditure in the public 
sector have risen - in a context of extreme resource scarcity - and by the late 1990’s 
were of the order of $1,000 million a year:
b. most of this - by the nature of the large, capital and import intensive projects which 
dominate transport, com munications and energy - has come from abroad;
c. some - even if not all - of the external flows are additional (at least to Southern Africa) 
and more are reallocated from  lower priority (or anti regional) projects which would 
otherwise have been financed;
d. especially in the 1990’s, sub-regionally oriented enterprise investment (e.g. in Beira 
Corridor and in export oriented manufacturing in several countries) has grown along 
with host domestic and external resources;
e. SADC runs the only Consultative Group programmed and managed by the recipients 
and putting up a cooperation proposal agenda analysed, evaluated prioritised and 
agreed by them (occasionally, but not usually, with some donor advice and/or adapted 
project suggestions);
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f. the Annual Consultative Conference - rather less central to SADCC (and especially 
SADC) than its share of total, and especially Northern, press coverage would suggest - 
is an open forum for sessional and corridor dialogue but both the keynote theme 
setting address and the final draft communique are by its Chairman (the Ministerial 
Chairman of SADCC) on the advice of his own officials and consultants;
g. Donor preferences do affect the degree to which projects are funded, but occasional 
donor attempts to substitute projects or to interfere on political grounds with the 
structuring and scope of ones they accept have been vigorously - and largely 
successfully - resisted;
h. SADCC gained a reputation for hard headed economic approaches, dialogue (neither 
shouting nor passive acceptance) and pragmatism (accepting limits of attainable) at the 
same time it rejected occasional donor proposals on economic ideology, included ANC 
and SW APO in conference attenders and sometimes speakers and criticised certain 
donor actions - e.g. Jonas Savim bi’s 1996 White House visit - firmly (even if not 
abusively).
This can not be fairly described as the record of “objective and subjective servants of neo­
colonial penetration” as has been asserted. In the context of the greatly constricted 
degrees of freedom open to small, poor, crisis wracked economies in the 1980s and 1990s 
it represents a not inconsiderable success in sustaining self determination and self respect 
even if - as SADC is the first to assert - the immediate levels of external reliance are too 
high.
10. The criticism  that SADCC/SADC are in fact a regional transport and com m unication 
coordinating group and little more is in part too hasty, in part out of context and in part 
because focus on spending alone (i.e. not policy, strategy, trade and investm ent together 
with public sector investment projects) distorts. In part, however, it may have been fair 
com m ent until the mid 1990’s.
a. over 1980-1990 the economic and territorial survival of M ozambique and the survival 
of Z im babw e’s ability to stand up to South Africa (which ultimately rested on access 
via non South African routes to key imports (inter alia petroleum products, arms, 
vehicles and - in drought years - food) were at risk so that keeping the routes to
41
Mozambican (and to a lesser extent Tanzanian) ports open was logically SAD CC’s 
first priority;
b. programmes to catch up on maintenance, to debottleneck, to expand existing links and 
to fill gaps were relatively non controversial with donors (albeit over 1980-85 they 
were somewhat disingenuously described as “new projects” to fit with the then donor 
fashion against rehabilitation, maintenance and restoration), could be produced quite 
rapidly and had clearer technical and (on the face of it) economic parameters than most 
other projects so attracted an overwhelm ing proportion of donor commitments;
c. per contra knowledge exchange and new research: e.g. in drought resistant crops and 
coordinated control programmes: e.g. against rinderpest, tse tse fly and the greater 
borer beetle, were much less cash intensive or high profile especially as their (at least 
partially achieved) purpose was to preempted impending disasters;
d. other sectors entailed substantial gestation -e.g. early warning systems and food 
security and hydroelectric grid interconnection and regional sourcing - so had little or 
no profile for years. But over 1980-90 Zimbabwe turned from projecting up to $2,000 
new thermal stations to looking to a regional grid and major power imports (from 
Zimbabwe, and potentially Botswana and Angola, as well as Zambia) as the strategic 
way forward while the 1992-93 drought response has already been cited;
e. certain sectors - not least trade and mining - did stagnate because sectoral unit 
sponsoring countries did not have the ideas, personnel and finance to make them 
dynamic. That was in part a price o f M ember State involvement by sectoral 
sponsorship, but in part a reflection that the lagging areas either did not have wide 
priority backing (e.g. mining), posed serious problems in synthesising initially 
incompatible national positions (e.g. trade) or had no through roads to substantial 
breakthroughs (e.g. a regional developm ent finance institution).
11. In the 1990’s both SADCC and PTA transformed themselves into economic communities - 
SADC and COMESA. In neither case did the change in name lead directly to a major shift 
in focus -SADC’s stress on security and CO M ESA ’s on trade barrier reduction (including 
trade finance and clearing) remained and evolved. However for the first time SADC 
(unlike SADCC) set a common market as a goal. It added labour (including interstate
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employment) and water (particularly interstate river water use agreements) as sectors and 
in each sector began drawing up detailed subsectoral covenant objectives with target dates 
for progress. COM ESA shifted toward greater stress on sub regional m obilisation o f 
external resources for sub regional programming including the Trade Bank.
12. The single m ost important event of the mid 1990’s for S ADC/COMES A was South  
Africa’s decision to join SADC (virtually predictable given FLS and SADCC links o f the 
ANC) and not to adhere to COMESA (much less predictable). Structurally - as well as 
in terms of historic contact and support - SADC was easier: sectoral programm es other 
than trade (e.g. M aputo corridor, water use agreements, intra regional/interstate pow er 
contracts, transport and communications, animal disease control, marine fisheries, tourism , 
food security) offer clear potential gains both to South African and to its new partners and 
do so rapidly while negotiating a front end weighted South African and a back end 
weighted partner route to a common market is technically and politically much m ore 
difficult because four SADCC partners are already in a customs union with South Africa. 
That meant that - apart from clearing and harmonisation - immediate gains to SA and 
COMESA from trade alone might have been low and negotiations tedious. That South 
Africa takes its economic links including trade with the sub-region seriously is 
demonstrated by its rejection of a number of EU proposals in its negotiations for a fresco 
style preferential toward free trade agreement on the grounds they would seriously im pair 
SA-Southem African economic integration and conflict with its SADC obligations. SA ’s 
accession to SADC ended any chance COMESA could - as it continued to propose - 
simply absorb SADC. Its failure to adhere to COMESA poses a potential m edium  term  
crisis illustrated by Mauritius sudden accession to SADC (in addition to its long standing 
COMESA membership) presumably because it sees achieving preferential access to South 
Africa’s market as essential. Kenya (and perhaps Uganda as much for regional security as 
trade or economic sectoral reasons) might well wish to follow the same course. If  the 
Reserve Bank of South Africa then opened a parallel clearing system, COM ESA m ight 
look very shaky indeed, unless and until the Horn becomes a potential area of 
economic/security integration under the leadership of Ethiopia, a new Sudanese regim e 
and just conceivably (purely on security grounds) Uganda.
43
13. However at present both SADC and COMESA are, and are perceived by most of their 
members, as making progress and delivering some economic benefits. Mauritius for 
example does view COMESA as useful in respect to East African markets and joined 
SADC to extend preferential access to SA not to leave COMESA. The duty reduction 
quota easing, form and regulation harmonising and user friendlying, trade finance 
augmenting, commercial clearing core of COMESA is sound and in no way inherently 
contradictory to SADC membership. SADC’s successes have been, and remain largely, in 
sectors other than official trade barrier reduction. South Africa’s accession has broadened 
and augmented them. On tariff/quota preferences the challenges are:
a. avoiding conflicts for the 10 COMESA/SADCC co-members, a condition which 
moving rapidly to a de fa c to  identical set of preferences to CO M ESA ’s among the 7 
other than South Africa and its 4 customs union partners would meet for the short to 
medium term;
b. negotiating a non sym m etrical barrier reduction between South Africa and the 7 
(and therefore unless a special arrangement can be devised) the other SACUA 
members and the 7 with initial cuts by RSA (and SACUA more generally) deeper;
c. averting a conflict between the EU ’s desire for a (very partial) EU-SA free trade 
agreement and SA ’s determination to foster, not torpedo, sub-regional 
integration;
d. negotiating to broaden CO M ESA’s clearing mechanism coverage to all interested and 
contiguous African states i.e. SADC-COMESA and potentially Congo (ex Zaire), 
Madagascar.
None of these challenges is such as to pose technical or economic problems of great 
severity. Nor is there reason to doubt political commitment in the relevant states. 
Diplomatic problems on both the SADC-COM ESA and the EU-SA (or EU-SA-SADC) 
axes may be more difficult to finesse.
14. In West Africa there has been a refurbishing of the Francophone free trade, tariff 
redistribution, monetary union arrangements. These appear to have been catalysed by 
the 1994 devaluation and the desire to ensure continued French Treasury fiscal and forex
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cover. The occasion was taken to review re-examine, reaffirm, retitle (rather more than 
restructure or redirct) the regional arrangements as well. This may well increase benefit 
flows marginally, but they are likely to remain on a low plateau.
15. E C O W A S has shown some signs of renewed attempts to build operational programmes in 
some of its economic sectors and in particular to get a preferential tariff scheme into 
operation and to unblock the clearing house. If these succeed, they will provide an 
econom ic com plement to the security front and perhaps put ECOWAS on the road to at 
least a modest recovery albeit not a breakthrough to a status comparable to COM ESA or 
SADC.
PAN AFRICANISM  REVITALISED: Full Circle Round or Upward Spiral?
1. Late 1990’s regionalism has in significant respects returned to the self determination, self 
reliance, self respect themes o f classic Pan Africanism. This is most clear-cut in the case of 
SADC with its FLS and Southern African Liberation Struggle roots but is also present in 
ECOW AS, 1GAD and the Uganda-Ethiopia-Eritrea-Sudan united opposition groupings 
work on conflict containment, resolution and transformation to good governance. Beyond 
trade it is least evident in COM ESA escept at rhetorical level.
2. Continentally the OAU has become vocal on good governance over the past five years 
and has abandoned the strict “domestic affairs” rubric in attempting to play m ediatory roles 
in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Somalia and Sudan. However, it has lim ited funds, 
personnel or credibility and has tended to act in support of national (e.g. Tanzania, 
Uganda, South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria) or Sub-Regional (ECOWAS, SADC) 
initiatives/interventions. W hether it can in this way build up a body of expertise and 
reputation (and thus the basis for mobilising resources and “ on call” peace enforcing 
troops) is not yet clear. In part it depends on the OAU being prominently associated with 
one or more success stories. Its most high profile involvements - Liberia and Sierra Leone 
- are highly problematic as to outcome.
3. The idea of an A frican peace keeping (enforcing) military force made up o f specially 
trained committed forces from several countries - a compromise between a perm anently
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unified armed force and peace ad hocery is again under discussion. Unfortunately the first 
high profile proposals came not from the OAU but from the USA. While the ideas of 
Northwestern financial underwriting, of OAU involvement and of African forces to contain 
and master African war and near war crises are welcome (and in discussion in Africa 
before the USA initiative) the up front leadership role apparently envisaged by the USA 
and use of the force being tied to the totally discredited - at least in Africa - UN approach 
to peace pronouncing and conflict fleeing forces which facilitated rather than blocked 
Rwanda genocide and de fac to  consolidated Aideed and Morgan in Somalia are not by any 
means universally welcome. It is noteworthy that the ECOMOG forces in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone are willing to fight for peace (whatever their tactical and capability 
limitations) and the Kampala-Addis-Asmara alliance to resolve the Sudanese civil war by 
transition to a peaceful, legitimate, federal governments’ approaches peace making more 
robust than even the NATO campaign in Bosnia.
4. The US training of troops from several countries - e.g. Senegal, Uganda, Ghana, Mali, 
Zimbabwe and potentially more - is not yet a problem. But it can become so if the OAU 
does not swiftly take command of setting parameters for when and how the force could be 
called up and deployed and also agreeing on a command structure when called into action 
plus a coordinated training programme. Realistically such OAU leadership will be possible 
only if championed by South Africa with firm  Zimbabwean, Botswanan, Namibian, 
preferably Mozambican and Rwandais, Tanzanian, Ugandan, Ethiopian, Eritrean, 
Senegalese, Malian and Ghanaian support and at least open consent from Cote d ’Ivoire 
and preferably from Congo (Brazza), Congo (ex Zaire), Angola and Cameroon. 
Realistically the force would be SSA focused as Egypt’s Middle East concerns and the 
Saharan Democratic Republic’s liberation struggle are not arenas in which it could be 
deployed for both political and military reasons.
5. ECA has become virtually irrelevant and will remain so until it redefines a vision, a set 
of strategic priorities and a credible set of programmes including dialogues. This 
irrelevance is particular notable in respect to Pan Africanism, governance and regionalism 
but is currently generic.
6. The ADB is rebuilding its financial and programming credibility and has secured funding 
to reopen the ADF. That does not by itself constitute a regionalist strategy, but ADF
46
credits are the only rational ADB funding for over half its members and to have an im pact 
on sub-regionalism and its drawing into a building block dynamic toward continental 
economic coordination to integration. ADB must be able to contribute to financing 
integration to play a meaningful role in dialogue about it. Earlier in the 1990’s ADB had 
begun to engage in serious research on sub-regionalism. That data base remains relevant 
to renewed strategy development now that the mid 1990’s financial mobilisation and 
operational credibility crises appears to be en route to resolution.
7. However, the trends visible today - most notably in SADC but also in ECOWAS and the 
Kampala-Addis-Asmara proto grouping - do not reflect a simple recreation of classic Pan 
Africanism nor an abandonment of the initial OAU model in its entirety. They include:
a. viewing security issues in terms of a unified position arrived at by a critical mass of 
governments whether within or outside a formal sub-regional institution;
b. deferring consideration of unification of armed forces, albeit with tentative thinking 
on joint training, allocation for peacekeeping duty and standby command-logistical- 
communications structures of components of security services;
c. relating military and diplomatic to household and economic security because the 
latter are seen to be causally linked to macro domestic insecurity threatening 
neighbours;
d. abandoning serious discussion of political unification - at least as a general 
approach - but also resiling from the OAU’s previous hardline “ internal affairs” 
position while groping toward definitions of decent (unacceptably bad) governance
and types/levels of domestic insecurity/dissidence which threaten neighbours and 
therefore are of legitimate sub-regional and OAU concern;
e. viewing econom ic means as important both in their own right and as means 
toward political and political economic objectives;
f. concentrating on community building among contiguous states with multiple 
common interests best pursued jointly and with some minimum levels of “ like 
mindedness” as to governance as an immediate through medium term objective with a
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subsequent - clear but very vague as to timing and modalities - amalgamation toward a 
continental economic, political economic and security community.
8. Whether these strands represent initial steps toward a consistent, contextual, feasible 
synthesis adapting Pan African goals and the realities of states and peoples in a way more 
structural change oriented than the OAU and more realistic and articulated (especially as 
to economic means and their processual and developmental interactions with security) than 
was classic Pan Africanism is as yet an open question. To argue that they were simply 
random adoption of unrelated responses to varying crises would be as unrealistic as to 
assert that a clear road to sub-regional economic and security communities and their 
unification of continental level was certain.
9. The abandonment of a very conservative, national supremacy version of internal affairs - 
non interference in - poses particular problems both conceptually and practically. The 
more radical of the classic Pan Africanists - not least Osagyefo Nkrumah - did view 
unification as an overriding principle justifying sweeping away obstacles - including 
entrenched, unsympathetic national governments - by force. More reflective Pan 
Africanists - e.g. Mwalimu Nyerere - saw a need for clearly expressed consent as a basis 
for legitimate unification. In practice Osagyefo never seriously contemplated 
overthrowing conservative W est African governments to achieve union and Mwalimu’s 
management of the Tanzaniyika-Zanzibar union creation was - by Tanzanian standards - 
singularly low on transparency and clear, free expression following discourse to determine 
public preference. The two basic positions - intervene to protect or to promote the 
common good (regional or sub-regional, security or political) and avoid action without 
prior consent and in particular action imposed by force across initial boundaries (e.g. the 
so called unification of Somaliland and Somalia as well as the 1961 suppression of 
confederalism converting Eritrea from a partner into an imperial outland) remain 
conceptually and to a large degree practically distinct or at least distinguishable. The latter 
is not on the OAU or formal sub-regional community agenda’s now nor arrive there in the 
currently foreseeable future.
10. The real difficulty is in defining and applying a workable position preserving the 
principles of consent, of avoidance o f self serving interference in a neighbour who 
neither poses a threat to the intervenor nor to African self respect, self determination or
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self reliance (as e.g. Macias Nguem a and Emperor Bokassa arguably did even if they could 
hardly be claimed to threaten the economic or military security of e.g. Cameroon, Nigeria, 
Gabon or Congo-Brazzaville) and of ability to take coordinated action from diplom acy  
and mediation through to econom ic sanctions and ultimately force when clear security 
risks/costs or truly monstrous malgovernance were palpably present. This problem was 
blurred until 1994 because in the case of deconstructing Portugal in Africa, the Rhodesian 
rebel state, occupied Namibia and the old South Africa diplomacy failed, economic 
sanctions (even when international backing was secured) were at best slow and partial 
tools, counterattacks (economic and military) imposed real security costs and risks and 
consent - or at least non consent to the existing regimes - was palpably present. The last 
point was - even in these cases - not as self evident when applied to the independence 
government. Luckily Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa had independently monitored 
free and fair elections prior to the change of regime which gave the incoming governments 
clear evidence of consent and a legitimacy they would not otherwise have had. In 
retrospect it is very unfortunate that internationally supervised (Portuguese supervision 
would have been neither feasible nor credible) elections were not held in M ozambique and 
Angola at independence. W hile these could not have averted later South African malign 
intervention, they would have increased the seen legitimacy of the governments and - 
especially in Mozambique - reduced the cracks providing leverage for Rhodesian and 
South African rebellion fomenting. Even in Angola the process of elections and - 
realistically - coalition building to seek to transcend the over 400 year old three way social 
and political cleavages within the country might have averted over a quarter century (and 
still counting) of civil war.
11. It is instructive that the only case - other than Southern African - in which the OAU has 
been able to declare a regime illegitimate - and then only after over a decade of tortured 
dialogue and disagreement - was that of the Sahara Democratic Republic. That is 
basically a case of colonial (or imperial) expansion - by Morocco. Thus - especially once 
Mauritania renounced its claim s - the OAU eventually did come to recognise POLISARIO
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as a legitimate liberation movement and - because it had a certain presence in the territory - 
a government. Arguably Burundi has become a quasi comparable case but it can be 
distinguished because:
a. sanctions were initially imposed primarily by Burundi’s neighbours (or arguably by 
Uganda and Rwanda plus a near SADC consensus and Eritrea/Ethiopia);
b. their endorsement by the OAU is tacit rather than clear;
c. the Burundi problematic is not simple - the President and his cabinet are not the basic 
enemies of decent governance but rather the competing armed forces - the Burundi 
Army which supports/constrains the President and the “Committee for the Defence of 
Democracy” (effectively the Burundian Interahamwe) which promotes and tentatively 
practices genocide and at a deeper level the pathological hatred based on the waHutu 
drive for power and vengeance and the waTutsi response of fear and preventive 
repression;
d. leading an incredibly difficult attempt to mediate a solution acceptable to the President 
(and his waTutsi and -potentially - moderate waHutu constituency) and to waHutu 
leaders willing to engage in a new attempt at intercommunal governance;
e. the need for Burundian state support in the military process of Zaire to Congo and the 
parallel loss of CDD bases) have rendered the economic blocage and the more general 
quarantine very leaky indeed and also reduced immediate military pressure on the 
Burundi army.
12. In other cases the OAU has remained unable to act or even to take clear verbal stands.
The 1994 coups in Lesotho and Gambia illustrate. The OAU vaguely deplored both but 
sub-regional action in one case and inaction in the other determined the outcome. Again in 
1997 in respect to Sierra Leone, the OAU has deplored the army mutiny allied to the pre­
existing rebellion but has called for mediation (in principle to restore the elected 
government) while warning against punitive measures let alone the use of force. Its 
present inability to endorse the ‘liberation alliance’ against the military - minority Islamic
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fraction regime in Khartoum is understable, but arises from failure to denounce and to 
organise action to reverse the military coup against the elected government (now a 
member of the ‘liberation alliance’) in 1989.
13. Whether the OAU is inherently unable to develop a less hands off (or impotent hand 
wringing) stance is not clear. The SDR case demonstrates that neither unanimity nor full 
consensus is required to shift from non interventionism to backing liberation. The SDR 
was recognised by the OAU once a majority of OAU members had recognised i t  
Presumably non-recognition of a coup regime (and suspension of membership) or 
continued recognition o f the (hopefully temporarily) ousted legitimate regim e by 
majority action is possible if general conditions for such action can be agreed and adopted. 
The problem of present illegitimate regimes and of initially legitimate ones which become 
illegitimate (e.g. some would argue potentially Swaziland, Kenya and Zambia) as well as of 
a coup rising or revolt against a clearly illegitimate government would appear to pose more 
intractable problems for the OAU, as they do sub-regionally. The Royal government in 
Swaziland clearly did enjoy legitimacy. It clearly still enjoys it from a substantial fraction 
of the population, while the urban/plantation/trade union alliance for a modern dem ocratic 
system, a purge of abuses and a constitutional monarchy also has the consent of a 
substantial fraction. On present courses there is real danger of a civil war with spillover 
costs (economic, social and local political) to Mozambique and South Africa. But the 
Lesotho coup reversal model is not relevant - mediation maximising areas of agreem ent or 
at least trade-off consent is needed with little reason to suppose sanctions or form al 
condemnations would serve. ‘Quiet’ (although hardly covert or silent) diplom acy at 
national and provincial level is seen by South Africa and Mozambique as more likely to be 
productive. But what of cases less clear cut than Sierra Leone and Swaziland e.g. long 
running governments of decreasing legitimacy with growing tendencies for repression and 
for at least potentially violent opposition to grow - e.g. Kenya, Nigeria? Or of m ilitary 
coup regimes which have democratised themselves by highly managed elections e.g. Niger, 
Gambia - and how to distinguish them from military interventions leading to genuine 
elections e.g. Mali, Ghana. Indeed Ghana is exactly the type of case which poses m ajor 
problems. Retired Lieutenant Rawlings in 1981 overthrew a government which had been 
fairly elected (indeed in elections he supervised) but had sunken into corruption and gross 
incompetence, and as events demonstrated, had negligible internal support or legitim acy.
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For a decade attempts (probably in this case quite genuine) to devise and hold broad 
dialogue on alternatives to W estm inster style elections dominated state political thinking 
and indeed such a system was devised for local government (successfully in many rural, 
but few urban, districts) and ultimately a reasonably free and fair national election on fairly 
standard Northwestern lines returned President Rawlings to office. Clearly reasonable 
persons could disagree (and did) on the legitimacy of the coup, the nature of the 
alternative seeking process, the lag in securing any transparent process of expressing 
public consent (or otherwise). These cases suggest a step by step approach starting with 
clearly unrepresentative coups against reasonably clearly legitimate elected governments 
(e.g. Gambia, Sierra Leone) and quarantines of gross and repressive malgovemance cases 
especially in cases of initial overthrow of legitimate, elected governments (e.g. Sudan).
14. These problems are not unique to Africa. The EU has been able to avoid confronting them 
directly by:
a. placing general validation of good governance in the hands of the Council of Europe;
b. declining to admit to states not clearly based on consent and with apparently stable, 
credible democratic systems (cf the dates of Spanish, Portuguese and Greek accession 
and at least one of the reasons Turkish accession originally envisaged as by or before 
1975 steadily recedes into the indeterminate future);
c. human rights issues are handleable under an agreed European rights statute and via an 
independent judicial structure. As the frame is agreed, the decision are judicial not 
executive and the cases do not strike at the heart of any state’s governance system no 
major crises erupt although even in this case there are tensions.
Perhaps a more analogous case is South East Asia and ASEAN. Since its membership 
ranges from a tumultuous multi party democracy (but earlier a personalised dictatorship) 
through an only modestly restructured and liberalised communist state to a highly 
repressive military/ruling clique elite dominated state which combines rapid growth in 
output, access to basic services and erosion of poverty with negligible accountability, 
severe repression and the invasion and annexation of a small neighbour, ASEAN has 
believed that a rigid “non interference in internal affairs” rubric was necessary. It acted on 
that in admitting a state in which a free and fair (or at least tilted against the winners)
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election had given a clear 80% mandate which was swept aside by a highly repressive 
military regime using violence and forced labour as instruments of first resort. One or two 
members did mutter mild dissent but accepted the line of quiet diplomacy once tied in by 
membership. In 1997 the coup using a parallel army and public official cadre by 
Cam bodia’s second largest party has forced ASEAN to reconsider; to suspend Cambodian 
accession; to seek to mediate (quite unsuccessfully) and to consider whether “preventative 
diplomacy” and a doctrine that “the change of a government (at least an existing, 
recognised elected one!) through the use of force is unacceptable” could be substituted 
prospectively (not retrospectively) for the all encompassing “internal affairs” one.
15. If one asks how classic Pan Africanism dealt with “internal affairs” and consent the short 
answer is that it did not because in its scenario neither question appeared to arise;
a. if all African states joined an African Union at or immediately after independence the 
issue of “internal affairs” could not arise - except in respect to division of powers 
between the Union and territorial governments;
b. because classic Pan Africanism was within the prism of struggle to overthrow  
colonialism  which did have overwhelming consent, it was assumed that the new 
Union Government would automatically be based on consent
16. The first assumption assumed a scenario now falsified by history. The second was either 
very broad brush indeed or naive. Consent to African Union and consent for any particular 
structure o f Union governance, of Union/Territorial division of powers (assuming 
confederalism which Mwalimu did see as necessary but Osagyefo did not with Padmore 
and du Bois not squarely addressing the issue - let alone a totally centralised state) and 
electoral process are not and never were the same thing. UNITA and its base for example 
supported the independence of Angola, but very much denied consent to a government 
they saw as a direct ascendant of the 1600-1800 Prazeiro (pre colonial neo-colonial) state 
and the 1875-1920 Luanda “creole” ascendancy.
These are clearly issues both sub-regional communities and the OAU must revisit. For 
different reasons neither classic Pan Africanism nor classic “non interference” provides a 
way forward.
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PAN AFRICANISM 2000: Portents, Problematics and Potentials
1. Has the recent re-emergence of Pan Africanism been a realistic attempt to forge an 
instrument for progress toward peace and self determination, economic progress and 
self reliance, decent governance and self respect? Or is it a forged - in a rather 
different sense - millennarist cult lashing out to ease the pain of repetitive disasters 
rather than addressing their causes? That is a fair question: the rapid evaporation of 
classic Pan Africanism; the failure of economistic free trade regionalism to generate either 
major concrete gains or political sex appeal and the 1980’s-1990’s explosion of civil wars 
and levels of social discord threatening more armed conflict or state deliquescence may not 
be portents heralding the triumph on the ground - as opposed to in neo liberal and neo 
Marxian salons - of Afro Pessimism but they are, or should be, vaccinations against 
naivete.
2. Nonetheless, three counter points can be made:
a. re-emergent Pan Africanism is not naive and maximalist, but rather only too aware 
of obstacles and reconciled to identifying and moving forward step by step in highly 
unpropitious global, sub-regional and - often - national contexts;
b. the combination of household through regional security with econom ic means to 
enable enhanced production is a response to challenges which is at least coherently 
thought through and has been effective elsewhere, e.g. in EU, ASEAN;
c. the sub-region (Southern Africa) and the states (e.g. South Africa, Botswana, 
Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia) most com m itted to sub­
regionalism on a broad front and to joint action to contain insecurity across 
borders and to intervene on behalf o f decent governance are those associated  
with national peace and reconciliation processes (Namibia, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa, Mozambique, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea) or with dynamics which have 
averted high levels of internal conflict (e.g. Botswana, Tanzania) and with 
recoveries in growth in production and provision of basic services. The correlation 
seems to be between sound national and proactive regional strategiesm, not o f using 
Pan Africanism as a form of khat (g’at) to ease the woes of domestic failure.
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To that it is still fair comment to points to the limits of the gains, the problematicity o f 
security, production and governance forward dynamics and the evaporation of initially 
apparently fruitful initiatives e.g. ECOWAS founding wave of euphoria, EA C’s first two 
years.
3. What are the key points around which sustainability of Pan Africanism as a major
component in a renewed, sustainable developmental dynamic will turn and progress tow ard 
which (or otherwise) usable as both ex post tests and ex ante warning systems on the 
health of institutions and processes?
a. combining official, infrastructural (e.g. lack of transport and communication) and 
enterprise (e.g. non orientation to regional sourcing and selling) trade barrier 
reduction with coordinated household and enterprise production expansion to
increase intra African trade;
b. building econom ic uniflcation/coorsdination instruments beyond trade barrier  
reduction which are based on commonly perceived common interests more 
efficiently pursued together and which add up to an increasingly important positive 
economic impulse;
c. providing security mechanisms relevant to households (e.g. food security, freedom  
from armed incursions), societies (e.g. law and order, freedom from refugee and 
neighbouring violent chaos burdens) and countries (e.g. from massive military expenses 
and actual or standby security force mobilisations and/or operations) and have 
proactive, preventive, and mediatory as well as defensively reactive, crisis containing 
and quarantining elements;
e. developing a workable definition of mutual affairs (as contrasted with internal) and 
a practicable dynamic for pre-emptive diplomacy, mediation and/or intervention to 
forestall, reduce, contain and/or restore from armed conflict;
f. involving enterprises, civil society and citizens in a sub-regional dynamic that is 
more than diplomacy and more open than civil service/cabinet decision taking and 
implementing.
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4. Trade promotion by official barrier reduction needs to be rethought in the context of 
the global tariff barrier reduction and quota elimination features o f 1990’s globalism
promoted in Africa by international financial institutions. The lower basic tariffs, the less 
possibility exists for tariff preferences and the fewer and looser quota restrictions the less 
important will be quota preferences. This is not to say COMESA and SADC should not 
press forward to sub-regional common markets and ECOWAS develop a viable dynamic 
to the same end, but that even in the official barrier reduction sphere complementary 
measures will be needed.
5. SADC’s preferential trade regim e could logically comprise:
a. adoption of PTA tariff preferences for all SADC members other than SA and 
coordinating future reduction rounds;
b. immediate RSA (and necessarily other SACUA member) preferential reductions for all 
other SADC members and in particular extending any free trade lines negotiated with 
EU to all SADC members (and for that matter all COMESA members or even all OAU 
members as a first step toward the Abuja Treaty goal of an African Common Market 
and to avert reverse discrimination for extra continental relative African supplies);
c. a phased, dated programm e to give similar preferences to South Africa (arguably these 
could be extended to other SACUA members immediately, given rules of origin tests 
this should not be impossible).
6. Beyond the possible S ADC-COM ESA preference systems de fac to  merger and the South 
African extension of EU duty free access to all OAU members, it is hard to identify any 
short term opportunities for progress toward an All African Common Market. In principle 
the North African states could extend fresco arrangement tariff preferences granted to the 
EU to other African states at no evident cost to themselves but their political and political 
economic priorities are (except perhaps for Egypt) not such as to suggest this is a realistic 
short term option.
56
7. Im portant complementary trade measures include:
a. reactivating clearing agreements and broadening them to cover all interstate 
transactions within their sub-regions (including legal transit, re-export, invisibles and 
capital transfer items);
b. strengthening clearing by sub-regional Central Bank consultative groups which - inter 
alia  - seek to reduce exchange rate over (or theoretically under) valuation obstacles to 
open trade and clearing particularly in respect to Angola and Nigeria;
c. completing customs nomenclature, procedural (especially valuation) and transit traffic 
arrangements and related vehicle licensing harmonisation - an exercise which in 
principle and perhaps in practice could be conducted continentally or at least by all 
SADC, COMESA and ECOWAS members and all other currently interested states;
d. eliminating “paper tariffs” (e.g. delays in clearing and release; repetitive rejection of 
papers for purely technical or typographical errors; ‘inexplicable’ delays or misrouting 
affecting transit traffic) which can nullify apparent preferences and indeed create nearly 
impermeable barriers to trade;
e. promotion - in close coordination with national and sub-regional enterprise fora of 
looking to African markets and for African sources (a less than com mon practice in 
m ost Africa countries). Catalytic funding to exploratory trade visits and trade fair 
participation by enterprise and to (preferably enterprise run, internet oriented) 
commercial
8. The case for reducing legal and administrative barriers to trade is im portant but is
complementary - rather than alternative - to reducing real (whether physical, inform ation 
or outlook) barriers. Physical barriers are primarily transport and com munications 
infrastructure. This has gaps but even more numerous sections in disrepair and high unit 
costs, e.g. the “natural protection” of Ethiopian manufactures with duty free access to the 
Kenyan m arket (and vica versa) against duty paid EU or Japanese or North Am erican 
manufactures is significantly negative because there is no cost viable road route and high 
cost and low reliability of coastal shipping (and Addis to Assab or Berbera) routes mean 
intra COM ESA transport costs are above EU-Nairobi. Information barriers turn on lack
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of timeous, reliable, detailed commercial data as to sources, markets, routings, finances, 
specifications, administrative requirements etc. Ethiopian (like Zimbabwean) wine 
includes modest amounts of high and medium quality and could be competitive with South 
African in Kenya and Tanzania (as could Zimbabwean in Zambia, Botswana, Malawi, 
Tanzania, Kenya) but neither producers/exporters nor importers/wholesalers have the data 
to develop the trade on any systematic basis. Outlook barriers are linked to data (data not 
sought is rarely transmitted regularly) and to institutional (e.g. financial facilities) 
limitations.
SSA producers are in general not very export oriented and still less oriented to non- 
traditional (including SSA) exports. The commercial sector and the input procurement 
and investment sides of other sectors are import oriented (perhaps too much so) but with 
limited exceptions do not look to neighbours as sources. The disproportionate scope of 
South African exports (and to a lesser degree imports) from SSA and of both Zimbabwean 
and Kenya exports to neighbours are evidence that different outlooks (in conjunction with 
less official barriers and less exiguous transport and communication infrastructure) can 
cause structural shifts in export volumes and destinations and in import sourcing.
9. The reduction of non-legal/administrative barriers or “paper tariffs”, documentation  
diversities and obscurities and user unfriendly land frontier immigration/customs
and provision of improved clearing have several advantages over simple tariff
preferences:
a. analytically they are globally cost friendly because they reduce cost barriers to intra 
SSA trade improving resource allocation and reducing CIFC (cost including freight 
and commercialisation) ex user for SSA (or sub-regional) goods absolutely and relative 
to extra regional sources by cost efficient, market consistent ways rather than by 
raising costs to extraregional suppliers;
b. therefore they unambiguously reduce costs to SSA users while allowing higher 
production by SSA suppliers (which regional protection by preference is likely to 
increase user costs) and reduce trade diversion by levelling the market playing field 
(whereas at best preferences level by offsetting unlevelling);
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c. and are not, therefore, subject to challenge at W TO or to erosion by global trade
barrier liberalisation (which will continue and from which SSA cannot opt out)
reducing headline tariffs and, pari passu, the room available for preferences.
10. At a deeper level production and employment are ends while international (or for that 
matter domestic) trade is a means to validate the production by linking supply to effective 
demand. This is a basic economic analysis point - whether in classical, neo-classical, 
Marxist or mainstream Northwestern thinking. Interestingly it is also a point which 
corresponds to politicians ‘and voters’ perceptions. They care about production, 
infrastructure and employment, not trade as such. The downside in respect to the political 
perception is an overemphasis on exports (justifying increased production and 
employment) and hostility to, or malign neglect of, intra sub-regional imports (seen as 
eating up market possibilities for domestic producers). The imbalance is dangerous, 
because - at least in SSA sub-regional contexts - unless poorer states can increase sub­
regional exports they can rarely afford to increase sub-regional imports paid for with hard 
currency from extra-regional exports and borrowing. Even if they could - e.g. less poor 
states such as Botswana with ‘natural’ extra regional trade surpluses - they are hardly 
likely to wish to share the costs of regional protection unless they have countervailing 
gains whether in production for export, transit transport cost reduction, security or/and 
other sectors.
11. If production (including research and training), employment, transport and 
communications, food security, power, water management and classically defined security 
as well as trade are valid agenda items of sub-regional bodies, the issue arises whether 
uniform schedules, priorities and sequences can be set out. The answer is almost certainly 
no. Both contexts and perceptions/priorities differ. SADCCs initial position - and still 
more its 1982-90 evolving position - was very different from PTA ’s. SADC’s post 1990 
priority for sub-regional water agreements turns both on the clear facts of aridity of much 
of the region and the number of major interstate river basins combined with the perception 
that unless water use and associated aspects of river basin development can be agreed by 
treaty soon serious hostilities among states (at best) land even war must be foreseen well 
before 2010. Perhaps the most general principles that can be set out are:
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a. an agenda of perceived com m on interests more effectively (or only) attainable 
jointly (or on a coordinated basis) rather than severally;
b. which provide significant perceived benefits to each member state fairly rapidly as 
well as the prospect of rising benefits over time;
c. and are - in sum - large enough to make the process of regionalism a domestic 
priority (probably higher in some cases but significant in all) for member states;
d. with a dynamic of adding and revising (and dropping in cases of clear non success) to 
maintain the forward dynam ic and to deepen integration; as well as
e. an openness to considering gradual expansion of membership to broaden 
integration.
That set of principles (or guidelines) implies that there is no reason each state has to be 
deeply concerned with all sectors or sub-sectors, let alone individual projects) e.g. 
marine fisheries in SADC axe hardly of much concern to Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, 
Botswana, Zambia or Z im babw e - albeit fresh water ones are in some cases) but are 
important to Tanzania, M ozam bique, South Africa, Namibia, Angola and Mauritius. 
Similarly, while individual water use agreements and power grid linkages and interflows by 
their nature cannot involve all 12 SADC (let alone all 22 COMESA) states, the sectors are 
of concern to a substantial majority. Nor need net gains from each sector be large (indeed 
small losses on some way be acceptable) - it is the perceived sum which matters.
12. The new aspects of security are:
a. household (or individual or people’s) security e.g. food security;
b. community security e.g. from  overwhelming transborder flows of migrants and - more 
clearly in classic security terms - drugs, guns and other criminal activities.
Household security is a new aspect of sub-regionalism, at least in Africa. In 
SADCC/SADC it has turned on jo in t and coordinated agricultural research, veterinary 
research and disease control, early warning systems and joint mobilisation of data, 
resources and logistics to m eet drought caused dearth. If successful, water management
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will have similar results cyclically in drought years and secularly for residents of water 
scarce interstate basins. The second aspect is in a sense a continuing one - immigration, 
drug, gun and crossborder crime cooperation are nothing new, albeit rarely high profile in 
SSA and a source of conundrums so long as the old South African existed. W hat is new is 
looking to causes - basically weakness of livelihood bases and domestic insecurity - and 
seeking to relate control measures to longer term proactive prevention e.g. in the proposed 
M pulumanga - Maputo Corridor development zone.
13. The straightforward aspect of classical - basically military and external - security is joint 
action to face extra regional threats, e.g. the Mobutu Regime in Zaire by its conduct 
raised threats to the security of and imposed costs on Angola, Zambia and Tanzania. 
Experience indicated these would end only when the regime did. Thus South 
African/SADCC “mediation” was really seeking a speedy, low violence m odus vivendi to 
secure a transfer of power. A second aspect has recently come to be seen as 
straightforward at least in extreme cases - the total collapse into bloody (literally) chaos of 
a sub-regional state or a blatantly unlawful coup against a legitimate regime. ECOW AS in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone (albeit not in Gambia or Niger) have acted on this front as has 
SADC in respect of Lesotho
14. Developing operational definitions and workable procedures for intervention in “mutual 
affairs” is probably the most difficult challenge - especially in cases of m em ber states 
(within sub-regional groups and - especially - for the OAU). For adjacent states threats to 
physical security (by armed incursion, refugee waves and/or intervention in m em ber 
internal conflicts) can in practice usually be identified with limited disagreem ent (e.g. 
Rwanda, Burundi, Congo-ex Zaire, Sudan) and do not face the problem of veto by the 
offending state acting as a member. However, even in such of cases serious problem s arise 
if most affected member states see the only viable solution as entailing a change o f 
government and wish to act in support of actors seeking such a change by force (e.g. 
Uganda in Rwanda; Uganda, Rwanda and Angola in Zaire; Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea in 
Sudan). SADC escaped this in Zaire because Mobutu was already falling and lead military 
support intervenors (Uganda, Rwanda) are not SADC members.
15. The problems in respect to violent changes of government within a subregion are greater 
even if the presumptive right of the state in question to veto is either rem oved or side-
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16. One guideline that probably could be agreed would be refusal to recognise coups against 
legitimate, elected governments and mediating with the threat of sanctions to 
achieve the reinstatement of the ousted government (e.g. Lesotho and Sierra Leone). 
Another - especially relevant to the OAU - would be to remove a state’s right to veto 
action designed to meet a security threat which it posed. General specifications beyond 
these are not now possible but might become so. In cases such as Lesotho 1996-97, 
(continued unrest relating to diminished legitimacy of the elected Prime Minister and 
smouldering unconstitutional tendencies in security services), Zambia (electoral laws ruling 
out key candidates and causing opposition to boycott) and Swaziland (impasse on 
evolution to a less feudal, more competitive structure) quiet diplomacy, other mediation, 
encouragement of sub-regional civil society initiatives and - perhaps - economic/diplomatic 
sanctions can sometimes be effective.
17. The need for sub-regional or OAU broad consensus (which might involve qualified 
majority rather than unanimity) if action is to be productive and not to split the acting 
group is somewhat different from the issue of whether action should be formally 
organisational, de fac to  delegated to leading states and/or sub-regionally assented to 
national action. Except in the Lesotho case SADC has not acted in its own name but via 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and/or Botswana. Fairly clearly 
however consultations involving all or most SADC states have preceded the actions. In 
the Zaire and potentially the Sudan cases this approach has allowed South Africa to act as 
mediator - in practice to facilitate a change of regime - while other states took a more 
openly partisan position.
18. The need for business and civil society involvem ent in Pan African regionalism is both 
political and economic, normative and procedural. In respect to civil society it is a return 
to classical Pan Africanism but in respect to business it is part of incorporating articulated 
economic means for implementing steps toward self determination, self reliance and self 
respect A functioning society - polity does have need to have three actors with discourse 
among them - government, enterprises, civil society. So too far a region.
19. In respect to business the problem is not primarily mechanical. Inclusion of Chambers of 
Commerce (and analogous) in consultation, specialised conferences and two way 
information flows is not uncommon. The problem is the tendency to parallel tunnel vision
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- each side focusing on lobbying at the other in respect to its own goals and neither 
focusing on areas of mutual interest and developing collaborative relationships. A linked 
set of issues (which also overlap transborder movement of people aspects of security) 
relates to trade unions which are civil society actors but also (primarily) economic ones 
like enterprises. In general state - employer - worker relations are national issues but they 
do have regional ramifications (especially if limitations on worker rights arise from states 
and enterprises wishing to use such restrictions to compete against their neighbours, if 
cross border employment is large and/or extreme poverty generates large flows of 
economic refugees).
20. Civil society involvement - via organisations but also in a more general sense via sub­
regional legislative or proto legislative bodies - is needed partly on good governance 
grounds and partly because Pan African awareness and especially support for sub­
regional dynamics requires more than official meetings, press releases and gains 
which citizens do not automatically relate to regionalism. Further since civil society 
groups in SSA increasingly have both sub-regional and SSA wide forums with transborder 
concerns in many of the same areas as sub-regional bodies the potential value of discourse 
and - where possible - coordination and the potential costs of state/civil society tensions 
and conflicting regional actions can be or become serious.
21. Sub-regional organisations need to develop strategy and structures in relations with civil 
society (including religious, wom en’s, community and domestic N G O ’s) and with the 
economic sector (business, trade unions, farmer’s organisations). One of SA D CC/SA D C’s 
strengths has been an openness to contact and communication and inclusion of these 
groups in special conferences, but it cannot be said that adequate ongoing relations have to 
date been developed by SADC or ECOWAS or COMESA. In this case the EU 
institutional pattern of perm anent consultative fora might be worth adaptation. The m ore 
general issue of accountability - while probably relevant only to SADC in the short term  - 
needs to be revisited. There is a very strong case for a consultative, communication and 
revising assembly whose resolutions would (at the least) have substantial weight in official 
and ministerial work. The problem is that of election. The old EAC had a lively A ssem bly 
of this kind, but its indirect election by (and usually from) national parliaments limited its 
two way communication impact although it also increased willingness to give it not
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inconsiderable legislative power - at least on paper. Direct election might be preferable, 
but so long as African sub-regional communities are basically multinational (coordinated 
and pooled national sovereignty) rather than supranational (partially pooling with 
delegation of sovereignty in specified areas) presumably implies that at least the Summit of 
Heads of State can override an A ssem bly vote.
22. The building block scenario for continental - or SSA - regionalism posits that both the 
habit of cooperation built up in smaller groupings and the lesser problems of bringing 4 or 
6 - say - sub-regional units than 52 or 53 states together make this step by step path 
prudent or even necessary. However, the initial projection apparently was one of rapid 
evolution of strong, comparable sub-regional units throughout Africa (or at least SSA) - a 
process that has not taken place requiring a revisiting of possible revised scenarios.
23. In fact Eastern and Southern Africa has the only two dynamic Sub-Regional Communities 
- COMESA and SADC. These overlap though in ways which would logically facilitate 
merger (not take-over). For historic reasons merger is not an immediate possibility. 
ECOWAS certainly exists and m ight become dynamic again. If it did so in ways 
producing clear economic gains (including in respect to tariffs and other aspects of trade 
and clearing) then its gradual integration with the non-currency elements of Francophone 
West African coordination should no longer pose insuperable problems. Equatorial 
Africa, the Horn and North Africa in practice have no sub-regional groups.
Therefore a literal reading o f Abuja of achieving five sub-regional communities (by 1995) 
and merging then (about 2000) is not self evidently practicable even with adjusted target 
dates.
24. A Horn grouping may come into existence - either within COMESA or, like SADC, 
overlapping it. If convergence among SADCC/COM ESA-Hom can be achieved then 
Egypt might consider accession. On the other side of the continent Congo (ex Zaire) is 
more likely to join SADC than to seek to revive the Equatorial (Central African) paper 
community. Thus a building block dynamic from South Africa through Congo, up the 
Indian Ocean and Red Sea coasts to Cairo and including the Indian Ocean states may be 
the most viable one. While initially not including ECOWAS or the six Equatorial states
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north of Zaire, the process might catalyse forward movement in ECOWAS and (apart from 
their monetary union) the Equatorial 6 could join ECOWAS or divide (Cam eroon-Tchad- 
Equatorial Guinea to ECOWAS and Gabon, CAR, Congo-Brazza with Congo-ex Zaire - 
to SADC respectively).
25. The keys to extending Pan African dynamics via the building block approach lie in 
SADC and the Horn. The achievement of decent, legitimate governance in Congo (ex 
Zaire), Rwanda and Burundi (to which SADC and in particular South Africa, A ngola and 
Tanzania are devoting substantial attention and resources) would almost certainly lead to 
their accession. That would create strong economic reasons for both Kenya (which w ould 
be welcome only after the restoration of more consensual, and broadly accepted as 
legitimate, governance) and Uganda creating a very real Southem-Equatorial-Eastern 
African grouping with political economic and security goals in large part pursued by 
economic means. With a new legitimate, federal regime in the Sudan, the Horn would 
become a real political economic region led by the Sudan and Ethiopia and leading to at 
least a peaceful quasi federal settlement in Somalia (with or without confederation with 
Somaliland and Djibouti). The amalgamation of that grouping with SADC - East A frica - 
Congo would pose technical and timing issues but few basic political security, political 
economic problems. At that point economic and African frontier security goals (the SSA 
partners would not wish to become embrangled in West Asian security) would make 
accession attractive to Egypt. Ironically perhaps “Cape to Cairo” may yet becom e a Pan 
African unifying axis politically quite unlike the concept of Cecil John Rhodes.
26. It is easy to dismiss such a scenario as daydreaming (or over consumption o f khat/g ’at) 
and certainly there are obstacles and chances for division. But in 1980 (and even m ore in 
1986 a prediction that by 1997 SADCC would be on the way to real integration including 
South Africa and its main security problems would be agreed water use rights and food 
security against drought and facilitating the achievement of good governance in Rwanda, 
Burundi and Congo (ex Zaire) internally on its external borders would have appeared an 
even less credible scenario.
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27. On the 40th Anniversary o f the independence of Ghana, the first African state 
committed to Pan Africanism the outlook for a renewed dynamic to African self 
reliance, self determination and self respect via political economic and security 
strategies pursued by the means of economic integration is more positive than it has 
been for nearly three decades. Southern African sub-regionalism is on the move and can 
merge with East African; the chaos of Central/Equatorial Africa and the Horn do show 
signs of removing entrenched, oppressive malgovernance and permitting forward 
movement Bitterly ironically it is now West Africa which increasingly lags - where 40 
years ago it led - in Pan African and sub-regional terms.
28. The role of leadership matters, but not solely in the sense of individual leaders im portant as 
they are contextually and as catalysts. Certainly FLS would not have become a force when 
and as it did without President Nyerere and nor would SADC have been launched when 
and as it was without the visions of President Khama and President Kaunda as well as 
Mwalimu. Certainly some ministers have been crucial or at least catalytic in key areas e.g. 
Senator Dennis Norman of Zimbabwe (as he then was) in launching SADC’s Food 
Security Unit and again - as Minister of Transport - in the successful struggle to prevent 
the Great Drought of 1991-92 and Great Dearth of 1992-93 from becoming the Great 
Death of 1993 or then Minister Adedeji of Nigeria in the creation of ECOWAS. Officials 
too have been key - e.g. Lebang Mpotokwane of Botswana as founding de facto  Executive 
Secretary and later interim Executive Secretary of SADCC and Secretary General Adedeji 
of ECA. But individuals cannot play such roles unless their national contexts provide 
backing - otherwise their endeavours either bombinate in a vacuum or, at best, flicker out 
when they leave the scene. Equally key is that of countries and of governance systems and 
goals built into their institutional and political structures committed to regionalism which 
are not dependent on one leader and, therefore, more enduring. Small countries can play  
catalytic roles e.g. Botswana in SADCC and (not entirely intentionally) Rwanda in 
creating the opening for sub-regional change in Equatorial Africa. But the big battalions 
matter - SADC’s dynamism today depends to a large extent on South Africa’s deep 
involvement and commitment while it is Ethiopia’s new government and governance that 
have created the - as yet problem atic - dynamic toward a New Flom Sub Region. In W est 
Africa Ghana and perhaps Senegal and Mali are minded to and could play significant
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supporting roles albeit Cote d Ivoire and Cameroon are concerned primarily with serious 
internal political and social cleavages and thus distracted. The basic problem is Nigeria.
Its malgovernance is not simply tragic for Nigerians. That sickness is contagious, prevents 
ECOWAS from becoming a W est African FLS/SADCC and condemns W est Africa Pan 
Africanism (at least at state level) and regionalism to drifting - drifting in a leaking boat 
with a rising wind on a lee share, the ironbound breaker barred coast of W est Africa.
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